Suppose Justine and Sarah are playing the dictator game. Justine is the dictator and has $100 to allocate. Based on repeated experiments of he dictator game, what is the least likely outcome for this game? Multiple Choice $100 for Justine and $0 for Sarah. $58 for Justine and $42 for Sarah. $50 for Justine and $50 for Sarah. $0 for Justine and $100 for Sarah.

Suppose Justine and Sarah are playing the dictator game. Justine is the dictator and has $100 to allocate. Based on repeated experiments of he dictator game, what is the least likely outcome for this game? Multiple Choice $100 for Justine and $0 for Sarah. $58 for Justine and $42 for Sarah. $50 for Justine and $50 for Sarah. $0 for Justine and $100 for Sarah.

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

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Question

Economics
Suppose Justine and Sarah are playing the dictator game, Justine is the dictator and has $100 to allocate, Based on repeated experiments of
the dictator game, what is the least likely outcome for this game?
Multiple Choice
$100 for Justine and $0 for Sarah.
$58 for Justine and $42 for Sarah.
$50 for Justine and $50 for Sarah.
$0 for Justine and $100 for Sarah.

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