Suppose a stage game has exacty one Nash equibrium (select all that apply) Oa ina finitely repeated game where players become more patient resuits other than the stage NE become feasibie. Ob in the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods. OC The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. Oe in a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE Oe. Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and piayers are patient enough.
Suppose a stage game has exacty one Nash equibrium (select all that apply) Oa ina finitely repeated game where players become more patient resuits other than the stage NE become feasibie. Ob in the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods. OC The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. Oe in a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE Oe. Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and piayers are patient enough.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Transcribed Image Text:Suppose a stage game has exactly ane Nash equilibrium (select all that apply)
a.
In a finitely repeated game where players become more patient results other than the stage NE become feasible.
D. In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods.
C. The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable.
d. In a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE.
e.
Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and players are patient enough.
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