Seven neighbors are debating the number of new parks to fund. You are running to be neighborhood president, how many parks should you pick as part of your platform if you want to win against any opponent? Name Preferred Number of Parks Joe 6 Debra 12 Melanie Laurie Alicia 19 Jake 2 Alex 1 O5

Seven neighbors are debating the number of new parks to fund. You are running to be neighborhood president, how many parks should you pick as part of your platform if you want to win against any opponent? Name Preferred Number of Parks Joe 6 Debra 12 Melanie Laurie Alicia 19 Jake 2 Alex 1 O5

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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12. Consider a game where each player picks a number from 0 to 60. The guess that is closest to half ofthe average of the chosen numbers wins a prize. If several peopleare equally close, then they share theprize. The game theory implies that (A) all players have dominant strategies to choose 0 (B) all players have dominant strategies to choose 30 (C) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick 0 (D) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick positive numbers 13. Behavioral data in such games suggests that (A) most subjects choose 0; (B) most subjects choose 30; (C) common answers include 30, 15, 7.5, and 0; (D) most subjects use randomization. Can you help me answer number 13 please?
Acres Willingness to Pay (Dollars) Sophia Amber Cedric 10 24 6. 8 18 3. 14 4 3 8. 3. 5. 1 6. 4 1 Consider the town of Springfield with only three residents: Sophia, Amber, and Cedric. The three residents are trying to determine how large, in acres, they should build the public park. The following table shows each residents' willingness to pay for each acre of the park. Suppose the cost to build the park is $24 per acre. How many acres should the park be to maximize total surplus from the park in Springfield? O 4 acres О З асгes O 1 acre O 2 acres
4. Consider a two player game with Fred and Barney, who tal turns removing matchsticks from a pile. They start with 33 matchsticks, and Fred goes first. On each turn, ecach player may remove either one, two, three, four, or five matchsticks. The player to remove the last matchstick wins the game. What are the optimal strategies for each player? Who will win? b. Suppose now that they can remove up to six matchsticks, how will the optimal strategies change for- each player? a.
Table 9-03. Suppose you are a general in the army. Your country is at war. You are trying to invade the enemy. You can attack on the enemys east coast or the west coast. The enemy has only enough troops to defend one coast. The payoff matrix below represents whether you or the enemy wins (represented by 1) or loses (represented by 0). Enemy Defend east coast Defend west coast Enemy: 1 Enemy: 0 Attack east coast You: 0 You: 1 You Enemy: 0 Enemy: 1 Attack west coast You: 1 You: 0 Refer to Table 9-03. To win the war, O a. you must attack the west coast, only if you have credible information that the enemy is defending the east coast. O b. you must attack the west coast, and information about whether the enemy is defending the east or the west coast is irrelevant to you. c. you must attack the west coast, only if you have credible information that the enemy is defending the west coast. d. you must never attack the west coast, and information about whether the enemy is defending the east or…
Consider the case of global environmental problems that spill across international borders as a prisoner’s dilemma of the sort studied in Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly. Say that there are two countries, A and B. Each country can choose whether to protect the environment, at a cost of 10, or not to protect it, at a cost of zero. If one country decides to protect the environment, there is a benefit of 16, but the benefit is divided equally between the two countries. If both countries decide to protect the environment, there is a benefit of 32, which is divided equally between the two countries. a. In Table, fill in the costs, benefits, and total payoffs to the countries of the following decisions. Explain why, without some international agreement, they are likely to end up with neither country acting to protect the environment.
Table 1.3: Erica and Fred's game. Fred Testify Remain silent Testify (-14, –14) (0, – 15) Erica Remain silent (-15,0) (-1, –1) What is the best global outcome, and how many years total prison time does it lead to? Both confess, 14 years in prison Both confess, 28 years in prison Both silent, 15 years in prison Both silent, 2 years in prison
7. Which of the following is not true of the “Battle of the Sexes" Game? a. The predicted outcome demonstrates how independent and rational play by players can quickly reach an agreement or a convergence of expectations concerning which strategy will be played by each player in equilibrium. b. The Battle of the Sexes Game can be used to depict a variety of situations where the players' interests do not precisely coincide, except for the fact that they both want to avoid the outcomes that would result from choosing different actions from one another. c. Players do not have a dominant strategy but playing “Boxing" say, is a best response to the other playing "Boxing" even if it doesn't give the player the payoff associated with his or her preferred alternative. d. Played only once, the outcome where each goes to their preferred venue cannot be Nash Equilibrium.
QUESTION 4 Match each of the terms to their description: Collusion A. an illegal official arrangment where firms work together B. firms work together Differentiated Products Cartel C. a game where cooperation provides the largest gains D. products have features that separate them from others. E. the branch of mathematics that analyzes decision making Game Theory Prisoner's Dilemma Click Save and Submit to save and submit. Click Save All Answers to save all answers. Save All Ar Type here to search 62°F
Suppose that Jason and Chad each are thinking of opening up a diet coke stand on the fourth floor of this building. Suppose that potential customers are evenly spaced on a distance that is normalized to 1. Customers will buy a diet coke from whichever stand requires the least walking. If they are the same distance the customer will flip a coin. This is depicted below. 1/4 1/2 3/4 Suppose that Jason and Chad are simultaneously choosing the location of their stands, what is the Nash Equilibrium location? a. One of them puts a stand at 3/4 and the other puts a stand at 1/4 b. Chad and Jason put their stands right next to each other at 1/2 c. One of them puts a stand at 0 and the other puts a stand at 1 d. There is no Nash Equilibrium
5. The following problem was first considered by John von Neumann and is a fundamentalresult game theory.A and B play the following game:A writes down either number 1 or number 2, and B must guess which one.If the number that A has written down is i and B has guessed correctly, B receives i units from A.If B makes a wrong guess, B pays 4/5 of a unit to A.First we consider the expected gain of player B.Suppose B guesses 1 with probability p and 2 with probability 1 −p.Let X1 denote B’s gain (or loss) in a game where A has written down 1.Let X2 denote B’s gain (or loss) in a game where A has written down 2.(a) Find the pmf of X1 and X2(b) Find B’s expected gain for these two cases, E[X1] and E[X2].(c) What value of p maximizes the minimum possible value of B’s expected gain?Now consider the expected loss of player ASuppose that A writes down 1 with probability q and 2 with probability 1 −q.Let Y1 be A’s loss (or gain) if B chooses number 1.Let Y2 be A’s loss (or gain) if B…
Acres Sophia Amber Cedric 1 $12 $24 $6 2 8 18 3 10 4 3 8 3 1 6. 2 6 4 1 7 2 Consider the town of Springfield with only three residents, Sophia, Amber, and Cedric (see the Table). The three residents are trying to determine how large, in acres, they should build the public park. Suppose the cost to build the park is $12 per acre and that the residents have agreed to split the cost of building the park equally. If the residents vote to determine the size of park to builo basing their decision solely on their own willingness to pay (and trying to maximize their own surplus), what is the largest park size for which the majority of residents would vote "yes?" 1 acre 2 acres 3 acres 4 acres
Two firms each currently dump 20 tons of pollution a piece into a local river. The government wants to reduce the amount of pollution in the river so they issue 5 permits to each firm. The cost for firm A to reduce their pollution by 1 ton is $1000 and the cost for firm B to reduce their pollution by 1 ton is $800. When answering the questions below simply enter the number for your answer do not write a full sentence. Question 1 If trade is NOT allowed what will be the cost of reducing pollution will be for firm A. total. for firm B, and in