Section A1: No collateral 1. The borrower Suppose the borrower takes a loan of $200 from the bank. Suppose that the interest rate charged on the loan is i (we'll find i later). a. What is her ex post income yfail if she fails? NOTE: I'm asking for realized income, NOT utility! b. What is her ex post income ysucceed if she succeeds? (hint: this will be a function of the interest i).

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
icon
Related questions
Question
Consider the problem of an entrepreneur/borrower with no money and a project requiring L=200
to be carried out. Assume that the borrower cannot use his illiquid assets to finance the project.
The entrepreneur
Once the entrepreneur undertakes the project, she decides either to work hard or to shirk.
• If she works hard, then she earns a high return R=$500 with probability p=0.75 and earns
nothing with probability (1-p)=0.25.
• If she shirks, she earns a high return with probability q=0.25 and earns nothing with
probability (1-q)=0.75.
The borrower has ex-post utility u(y)=y-D if she works hard and u(y)=y if she does not work
hard, where y is her income (after loan payments) carned from the project. Assume D=125.
The bank:
A bank is willing to finance the project and lend $200 to the borrower. The bank charges the
agent an interest rate of i on the loan.
The borrower always repays the loan when she succeeds. If she fails, she is protected by limited
liability: she repays nothing to the bank.
Finally, assume that the bank could also purchase $200 in risk-free bonds with a return of
r=0.10, and that the financial markets are perfectly competitive.
Section A1: No collateral
1. The borrower
Suppose the borrower takes a loan of $200 from the bank. Suppose
that the interest rate charged on the loan is i (we'll find i later).
a. What is her ex post income yail if she fails? NOTE: I'm asking for realized
income, NOT utility!
b. What is her ex post income ysuceed if she succeeds? (hint: this will be a function of
the interest i).
Transcribed Image Text:Consider the problem of an entrepreneur/borrower with no money and a project requiring L=200 to be carried out. Assume that the borrower cannot use his illiquid assets to finance the project. The entrepreneur Once the entrepreneur undertakes the project, she decides either to work hard or to shirk. • If she works hard, then she earns a high return R=$500 with probability p=0.75 and earns nothing with probability (1-p)=0.25. • If she shirks, she earns a high return with probability q=0.25 and earns nothing with probability (1-q)=0.75. The borrower has ex-post utility u(y)=y-D if she works hard and u(y)=y if she does not work hard, where y is her income (after loan payments) carned from the project. Assume D=125. The bank: A bank is willing to finance the project and lend $200 to the borrower. The bank charges the agent an interest rate of i on the loan. The borrower always repays the loan when she succeeds. If she fails, she is protected by limited liability: she repays nothing to the bank. Finally, assume that the bank could also purchase $200 in risk-free bonds with a return of r=0.10, and that the financial markets are perfectly competitive. Section A1: No collateral 1. The borrower Suppose the borrower takes a loan of $200 from the bank. Suppose that the interest rate charged on the loan is i (we'll find i later). a. What is her ex post income yail if she fails? NOTE: I'm asking for realized income, NOT utility! b. What is her ex post income ysuceed if she succeeds? (hint: this will be a function of the interest i).
2. The bank.
Suppose that the bank believes the agent will work hard. (HINT: Slides 6-
12).
a. What is the expected profits E(II) if the bank lends to the borrower? (hint: this
will be a function of i).
b. What is the expected profits E(II) if the bank purchases the risk-free bonds.
c. Write down the zero profit condition.
d. What is the interest rate that the bank will charge?
Will the borrower work hard at that interest rate? (hint: plug the
3. Equilibrium
interest rate the bank will charge in the No-shirking condition and check whether the
condition holds).
Transcribed Image Text:2. The bank. Suppose that the bank believes the agent will work hard. (HINT: Slides 6- 12). a. What is the expected profits E(II) if the bank lends to the borrower? (hint: this will be a function of i). b. What is the expected profits E(II) if the bank purchases the risk-free bonds. c. Write down the zero profit condition. d. What is the interest rate that the bank will charge? Will the borrower work hard at that interest rate? (hint: plug the 3. Equilibrium interest rate the bank will charge in the No-shirking condition and check whether the condition holds).
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 4 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Ordinary and Capital gains
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
Recommended textbooks for you
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:
9780190931919
Author:
NEWNAN
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education