s each firm's marginal cost is $0.28 per unit? e Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q; equals and 92 equals (Enter numeric responses using real numbera rounded to two decimal places.) rthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of S (Round your answer to the nearest penny.)

s each firm's marginal cost is $0.28 per unit? e Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q; equals and 92 equals (Enter numeric responses using real numbera rounded to two decimal places.) rthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of S (Round your answer to the nearest penny.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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