Rosario has to finish her dissertation within 10 days, that is, at time t = 1, t = 2, ..., or t = 10. It takes one day to finish the dissertation, and on the day Rosario does so, she incurs an instantaneous disutility cost equivalent to $10. Rosario is a hyperbolic discounter with β = 0.85 and δ = 1. Her (instantaneous) utility function is u(x) = x. (a)  Suppose the university has a system in which it charges Rosario $1 in fees for every day she does not finish her dissertation (paid each day that it is incurred). E.g., finishing on day 2 incurs a cost of $1 paid on day 1. When does Rosario finish if she is naive? How much does she pay in penalties? (Hint, past penalties are sunk, e.g., from the perspective of t = 2 self, any penalties paid in t = 1 are sunk, and do not factor into decisions or utilities going forward.) (b)  Still in the $1/day system, when does Rosario finish if she is sophisticated? (c)  Now suppose that the university has a deadline system: Rosario incurs a penalty of $10 (paid on the day the dissertation is completed) if she does not finish her dissertation before day 10 (so finishing on day 9 does not trigger the penalty, but finishing on day 10 does). There are no daily penalties. When does Rosario finish in this system if she is naive? How much does she pay in penalties? (d)  When does Rosario finish in the deadline system if she is sophisticated? (e)  Does it make a big difference to a naive hyperbolic discounter whether she is in a day-by-day-penalty or deadline system? Explain intuitively. (f)  Does it make a big difference to a sophisticated hyperbolic discounter whether she is in a day-by-day-penalty or deadline system? Explain intuitively.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
icon
Related questions
Question

Rosario has to finish her dissertation within 10 days, that is, at time t = 1, t = 2, ..., or t = 10. It takes one day to finish the dissertation, and on the day Rosario does so, she incurs an instantaneous disutility cost equivalent to $10. Rosario is a hyperbolic discounter with β = 0.85 and δ = 1. Her (instantaneous) utility function is u(x) = x.
(a)  Suppose the university has a system in which it charges Rosario $1 in fees for every day she does not finish her dissertation (paid each day that it is incurred). E.g., finishing on day 2 incurs a cost of $1 paid on day 1. When does Rosario finish if she is naive? How much does she pay in penalties? (Hint, past penalties are sunk, e.g., from the perspective of t = 2 self, any penalties paid in t = 1 are sunk, and do not factor into decisions or utilities going forward.)
(b)  Still in the $1/day system, when does Rosario finish if she is sophisticated?
(c)  Now suppose that the university has a deadline system: Rosario incurs a penalty of $10 (paid on the day the dissertation is completed) if she does not finish her dissertation before day 10 (so finishing on day 9 does not trigger the penalty, but finishing on day 10 does). There are no daily penalties. When does Rosario finish in this system if she is naive? How much does she pay in penalties?
(d)  When does Rosario finish in the deadline system if she is sophisticated?
(e)  Does it make a big difference to a naive hyperbolic discounter whether she is in a day-by-day-penalty or deadline system? Explain intuitively.
(f)  Does it make a big difference to a sophisticated hyperbolic discounter whether she is in a day-by-day-penalty or deadline system? Explain intuitively.

Expert Solution
trending now

Trending now

This is a popular solution!

steps

Step by step

Solved in 7 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Variable Cost
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
Recommended textbooks for you
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:
9780190931919
Author:
NEWNAN
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education