First-year Commerce students were asked to play an Ultimatum game where a choice had to be made over the division of R100. Offers could only be made in R10 increments, and the results of the various offers made are reported in the table below. Amount offered by Proposer RO R10 Proportion rejected What is the equilibrium split of the R100 between the Proposer and the Responder? A. Proposer: R50, Responder: R50 B. Proposer: R10, Responder: R90 OC. Proposer: R90, Responder: R10 OD. Proposer: R60, Responder: R40 E. Proposer: R40, Responder: R60 100% 60% R20 50% R30 30% R40 10% R50 096

First-year Commerce students were asked to play an Ultimatum game where a choice had to be made over the division of R100. Offers could only be made in R10 increments, and the results of the various offers made are reported in the table below. Amount offered by Proposer RO R10 Proportion rejected What is the equilibrium split of the R100 between the Proposer and the Responder? A. Proposer: R50, Responder: R50 B. Proposer: R10, Responder: R90 OC. Proposer: R90, Responder: R10 OD. Proposer: R60, Responder: R40 E. Proposer: R40, Responder: R60 100% 60% R20 50% R30 30% R40 10% R50 096

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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