meogout SuccessiulExhibit HW2.4: Total Revenues and Total Costs for a Representative Competitive FimMoneyTCTRC61GivenQ1 = 2Q2 = 5Q3Q4C611C5TFC = S1.60Cl=S4.00C2 = S8.20C3 = s10.00C4 = SI1.20C4ntsC3C2iBs16.00Có=S22.00Cố1 = S30.40C5CiTFCIAQ1 Q2Q3Q4toringboardRefer to Exhibit HW2.4. If output is Q3, average variable cost is aboutO $1.12O $1.22tsO $1.10O $1.20étvMacBook Proved%3

Average variable cost is total variable cost divided by units of output.

Revenies Money TC TR C61 Given Q1 = 2 Q2 Q3 = 8 Q4=|11 C6 E C5 7c S1.60 S4.00 C2 = S8.20 S10.00 TFC C1 C3 C4 S11.20 C5 = s16.00 S22.00 S30.40 C2 TFC IA Có1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Refer to Exhibit HW2.4. If output is Q3, average variable cost is about $1.12 O $1.22 O $1.10 O $1.20 D)

Revenies Money TC TR C61 Given Q1 = 2 Q2 Q3 = 8 Q4=|11 C6 E C5 7c S1.60 S4.00 C2 = S8.20 S10.00 TFC C1 C3 C4 S11.20 C5 = s16.00 S22.00 S30.40 C2 TFC IA Có1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Refer to Exhibit HW2.4. If output is Q3, average variable cost is about $1.12 O $1.22 O $1.10 O $1.20 D)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Question

me
ogout Successiul
Exhibit HW2.4: Total Revenues and Total Costs for a Representative Competitive Fim
Money
TC
TR
C61
Given
Q1 = 2
Q2 = 5
Q3
Q4
C6
11
C5
TFC = S1.60
Cl=S4.00
C2 = S8.20
C3 = s10.00
C4 = SI1.20
C4
nts
C3
C2
iB
s16.00
Có=S22.00
Cố1 = S30.40
C5
Ci
TFC
IA
Q1 Q2
Q3
Q4
toring
board
Refer to Exhibit HW2.4. If output is Q3, average variable cost is about
O $1.12
O $1.22
ts
O $1.10
O $1.20
étv
MacBook Pro
ved
%
3

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