meogout SuccessiulExhibit HW2.4: Total Revenues and Total Costs for a Representative Competitive FimMoneyTCTRC61GivenQ1 = 2Q2 = 5Q3Q4C611C5TFC = S1.60Cl=S4.00C2 = S8.20C3 = s10.00C4 = SI1.20C4ntsC3C2iBs16.00Có=S22.00Cố1 = S30.40C5CiTFCIAQ1 Q2Q3Q4toringboardRefer to Exhibit HW2.4. If output is Q3, average variable cost is aboutO $1.12O $1.22tsO $1.10O $1.20étvMacBook Proved%3

Average variable cost is total variable cost divided by units of output. Total cost is the sum of fixed and variable costs. Fixed costs is given as $1.60. When output is Q3, units of production is given as 8 units. At Q3, total costs for 8 units is $11.20(C4) and total variable costs = $11.20 - $1.60= $9.60 Therefore average variable costs at Q3 = $9.60/8 = $1.20 The correct option is, $1.20

Business

Economics

Revenies Money TC TR C61 Given Q1 = 2 Q2 Q3 = 8 Q4=|11 C6 E C5 7c S1.60 S4.00 C2 = S8.20 S10.00 TFC C1 C3 C4 S11.20 C5 = s16.00 S22.00 S30.40 C2 TFC IA Có1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Refer to Exhibit HW2.4. If output is Q3, average variable cost is about $1.12 O $1.22 O $1.10 O $1.20 D)

Revenies Money TC TR C61 Given Q1 = 2 Q2 Q3 = 8 Q4=|11 C6 E C5 7c S1.60 S4.00 C2 = S8.20 S10.00 TFC C1 C3 C4 S11.20 C5 = s16.00 S22.00 S30.40 C2 TFC IA Có1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Refer to Exhibit HW2.4. If output is Q3, average variable cost is about $1.12 O $1.22 O $1.10 O $1.20 D)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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