123 THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other. Reply Obj. 2. It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is sub- ject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little de- fect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be con- trary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the genera- tion of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchir. ii): Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to pro- duce good even from evil. It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things-e.g., casual and evil things-as removed from the care of divine providence. Reply Obj. 3. Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in apply- ing art and virtue to his own use. Hence hu- man providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but di- vine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine provi- dence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and others of the an- cients. Reply Obj. 4. When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force de- termined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational crea- tures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: In the hand of his own counsel. But since the very Pt. 1 Q. 22 Art. 3 act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happen- ing from the exercise of free will must be sub- ject to divine providence. For human provi- dence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final sal- vation. For to them that love God, all things work together unto good (Rom. viii. 28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to aban- don them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not pre- served in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine provi- dence human affairs concerning which we take counsel. Reply Obj. 5. Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 10), it is sub- ject to divine providence in an especial man- ner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it ac- cordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. THIRD ARTICLE Whether God Has Immediate Providence over Everything? We proceed thus to the Third Article:- Objection 1. It seems that God has not im- mediate providence over all things. For what- ever is contained in thotion of dignity, must be attributed to Go But it belongs to the dignity of a king, fat he should have minis- ters; through whe mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things. Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be with- drawn, Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchir. 17) that, It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things: and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii. 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things. On the contrary, It is said (Job xxxiv. 13): What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made? On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv. 20): Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made. I answer that, Two things belong to provi dence-namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execu- tion of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immedi- ate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He as- signs to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's provi- dence; for He governs things inferior by su- perior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De provid. viii. 3), is exploded. He taught a three- fold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be gen- erated and corrupted, he attributed to the di- vinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move cor- poreal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei 1 1, 2 viii. 14). Reply Obj. 1. It perta is to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it con- siders the particular things with which its action is concerned. Reply Obj. 2. God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above (Q. 19, AA. 5, 8). Reply Obj. 3. It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is bet- ter and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; and because the ΑΙ 124 thought of evil sometimes perverts the will to- wards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil. FOURTH ARTICLE Whether Providence Imposes Any Necessity on Things Foreseen? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:- Objection 1. It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a per se cause, either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi. 7). But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore di- vine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen. Obj. 2. Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He as- signs the stability of necessity to things pro- vided. Obj. 3. Further, Boëthius says (De Consol. iv. 6): Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and for- tunes by the indissoluble connection of causes. It seems therfore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. On the contrary, Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv. 23) to corrupt nature is not the work of providence. But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency. I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an ex- trinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the uni- verse; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes. Reply Obj. 1. The effect of divine provi- dence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency." Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to hap- libly and of necessity; and that happens from pen infallibly and of necessity happens infal- quiry: (1) Whether providence is suitably as- signed to God? (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence? (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things? (4) Whether divine provi- dence imposes any necessity upon things fore- seen? FIRST ARTICLE Whether Providence Can Suitably Be Attributed to God? We proceed thus to the First Article:- Objection 1. It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, accord- ing to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of pru- dence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi. 5, 9, 18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God. Obj. 2. Further, whatever is in God, is eter- nal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii. 29). Therefore there is no providence in God. Obj. 3. Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intel- lect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.. On the contrary, It is said (Wis. xiv. 3): But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence.* I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). In created things good is found not only as regards their sub- stance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (Q. 21, A. 4). This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. 19, A. 4), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of pru- dence, to which two other parts are directed- namely, remembrance of the past, and under- standing of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the under- standing of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to *Vulg., But Thy providence, O Father, governeth it. prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi. 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself-as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city, or kingdom; in which sense it is said (Matth. xxiv. 45), a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family. In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of the order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boëthius says (De Consol. iv. 6) that Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things: which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole. Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi. 9, 10), Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that "ebulia" has rightly counselled and "synesis" rightly judged. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that coun- sel is an inquiry into matters that are doubt- ful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God, according to Ps. cxlviii. 6: He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away. In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take coun- sel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will (Eph. i. 11). Reply Obj. 2. Two things pertain to the care of providence-namely, the reason of order, which is called providence and dispo- sition; and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eter- nal, and the second is temporal. Reply Obj. 3. Providence resides in the in- tellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is di- rected towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above (Q. 19). > † Cf. I-II, Q. 57, A. 6. 2.22 Art. 2 Pt. 1 GOD AND THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES SECOND ARTICLE Whether Everything Is Subject to the Providence. of God? We proceed thus to the Second Article:- Objection 1. It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then every- thing was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion. Obj. 2. Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything. Obj. 3. Further, whatever happens of neces- sity does, not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi. 5, 9, 10, 11): Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice. Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence. Obj. 4. Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a gov- ernor. But men are left to themselves by God, in accordance with the words: God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand. of his own counsel (Ecclus. xv. 14). And par- ticularly in reference to the wicked: I let them go according to the desires of their heart (Ps. lxxx. 13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine providence. Obj. 5. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. ix. 9): God doth not care for oxen*: and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence. On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wis- dom: She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly (Wis. viii. 1). I answer that, Certain persons totally de- nied the existence of providence, as Democri- tus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to provi- dence and corruptible things not in their indi- vidual selves, but only according to their spe- cies; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job xxii. 14): The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven. Rabbi Moses, however, ex- cluded men from the generality of things cor- ruptible, on account of the excellence of the Vulg., Doth God take care for oxen? 122 intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others. We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in gen- eral, but even in their own individual selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causal- ity of the first agent extends. Whence it hap- pens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things cor- ruptible. Hence all things that exist in what- soever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: Those things that are of God are well ordered (Rom. xiii. 1). Since, therefore, as the provi- dence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown (Q. 14, AA. 6, 11) that God knows all things, both universal and par-. ticular. And since His knowledge may be com- pared to the things themselves, as the knowl- edge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art. Reply Obj. 1. There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For noth- ing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for in- stance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particu- lar, causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meet- ing of two servants, although to them it ap- pears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely † Vulg., Those powers that aré, are ordained of God: - Quæ autem sunt, a Deo ordinata sunt, St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: Que a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.