Question III (20 points): Consider the case of two natural monopolists for two different products, with identical long-run average costs and identical horizontal long run-marginal costs. The first monopolist faces a relatively inelastic demand, and the second monopolist faces a relatively elastic demand. Both demands, however, share the same vertical intercept. Explain the following, showing the justification to your explanation with properly labeled graphs (use a separate graph for each of a and b below): a. Which monopolist is the less likely target for government regulation? Why? b. If the government considers making both products a “public good" produced by the monopolists. Which product will place a heavier burden on the government's budget?

Question III (20 points): Consider the case of two natural monopolists for two different products, with identical long-run average costs and identical horizontal long run-marginal costs. The first monopolist faces a relatively inelastic demand, and the second monopolist faces a relatively elastic demand. Both demands, however, share the same vertical intercept. Explain the following, showing the justification to your explanation with properly labeled graphs (use a separate graph for each of a and b below): a. Which monopolist is the less likely target for government regulation? Why? b. If the government considers making both products a “public good" produced by the monopolists. Which product will place a heavier burden on the government's budget?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Consider the weekly market for gyros in a popular neighborhood close to campus. Suppose this market is operating in long-run competitive equilibrium with many gyro vendors in the neighborhood, each offering basically the same gyros. Due to the structure of the market, the vendors act as price takers and each individual vendor has no market power. The following graph displays the supply (S = MC) and demand (D) curves in the weekly market for gyros. Place the black point (plus symbol) on the graph to indicate the market price and quantity that will result from competition. PRICE (Dollars per gyro) 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 0 10 20 30 Competitive Market 40 60 QUANTITY (Gyros) 50 70 80 S=MC D 90 100 PC Outcome (?) Now assume that one of the gyro vendors successfully petitions the neighborhood development board to obtain exclusive rights to sell gyros in the neighborhood. This firm buys up all the rest of the gyro food trucks in the area and begins to operate as a monopoly.…
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