Question #6: Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb = 215 - 7Qb. %3D The marginal cost for firm I is given by mcl = 3 Q. The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2 = 9 Q. (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $ 78 and firm 2 has a fixed cost of $ 135 .) What is level of total surplus in the duopoly equilibrium ?

Question #6: Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb = 215 - 7Qb. %3D The marginal cost for firm I is given by mcl = 3 Q. The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2 = 9 Q. (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $ 78 and firm 2 has a fixed cost of $ 135 .) What is level of total surplus in the duopoly equilibrium ?

Micro Economics For Today

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337613064

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 11SQP

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