Question 4 Suppose that there is a 10% chance Ja'Marr is sick and earns $10,000, and a 90% chance he is healthy and will earn $70,000. Suppose further that his utility function is the following (utility = square root of income) U (I) = VIncome Ja'Marr's expected income is $60,000 $70,000 O $40,000 O $64,000

Question 4 Suppose that there is a 10% chance Ja'Marr is sick and earns $10,000, and a 90% chance he is healthy and will earn $70,000. Suppose further that his utility function is the following (utility = square root of income) U (I) = VIncome Ja'Marr's expected income is $60,000 $70,000 O $40,000 O $64,000

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.1P

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Jien is just bored all the time; no amount of success makes him happy, it seems. Below is a list of his income for the last several years and the utility he experienced per dollar of income: Year Yearly Income Utility per Dollar Earned 2017 $60,000 2 utils 2018 $70,000 1.8 2019 $100,000 1.5 2020 $120,000 1 2021 $145,000 0.40 From the above, we can say that Jien most likely is different from most people economists study in terms of risk attitudes is "risk loving" will not take a fair bet has a utility of wealth curve that is a straight line
Betty is looking for a job. She considers job opportunities intwo cities. Bettyís utility is given by y- x, where y is the lifetime income andx is the amount spent on buying a house. The income from City 1 fluctuatesalthough the house price is stable. On the contrary, the income from City2 is stable while the house price fluctuates. If she moves to City 1, Bettycan earn a lifetime income y1 with probability alpha and 1 + y1 with probability1-alpha . The house price in City 1 is x1. Moving to City 2 means that Bettycan earn an income of y2. However, the house price is x2 with probabilitygamma and 1 + x2 with probability 1-gamma . Do the following: (a) Write down theexpected utilities associated with living in the two respective cities, i.e., V1and V2. (b) Derive the condition under which Betty chooses City 1.
Upon graduating from UT this May, you take on a management position working at UtMax theater. You will consider the utility of seeing performance over 1 month, and suppose that at a regular price of $$$ per ticket (my assigned ticket price is 145), customers will see no performance, however with the price reduced by $5, customers will see one performance per month and when reduced by $10, customers will see two performances. As long as the number performances, x, is small, your demand function for performance can be modeled by p=D(x). Write down your demand function.
Linda loves buying shoes and going out to dance. 20 Her utility function for pairs of shoes, S, and the number of times she goes dancing per month, T, is: 18- 16- U(S, T) = 2ST 14- It costs Linda $75 to buy a new pair of shoes or to spend an evening out dancing. Assume that she has $750 to spend on shoes and dancing. E 12- 1.) Use the line drawing tool to draw Linda's budget line. Properly label this line. 10- 2.) Use the point drawing tool to locate Linda's optimal consumption bundle. Label this point 'R'. 8- 6- Carefully follow the instructions above, and only draw the required objects. 4- What is Linda's marginal rate of substitution? -. (Enter your response as an 2- integer. Note that the minus sign is already included.) 0- 12 10 Shoes (S) 14 16 18 20 React tv MacBook Air 80 DII F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 @ 23 2$ & 1 3 4 7 8 Q W E T Y { A S F H. J K C V M. く tion command command option ピーの Dancing (T) コ B. レ

MN.42.
1) to avoid an accident at work or not exert any effort (e John is deciding whether to exert effort (e = 0). If e = 1, the probability of an accident is 0.5. If e = 0, the probability of an accident is 1. John's income without the accident is $100. In case of an accident, medical expenses will be $64. John utility of income is VI. The cost of effort, C(e), is 0 if effort is e = 0 and 1 if effort is e = 1. John's utility function is u(I, e) = Vī – C(e). (a) What are the expected utility values that John would face when he exerts effort and when he does not exert effort? Based on your calculations, should he exert effort? Briefly explain the intuition behind his decision in one or two sentences. Now suppose there is a risk neutral insurance company. Suppose the insurance company cannot monitor whether John exerts effort or not. The insurance company considers two plan contracts. Contract Plan A: Premium: p = $36. Payout in the event of accident: d = $64 Contract Plan B: Premium: p = $19.…
John is deciding whether to exert effort (e = 1) to avoid an accident at work or not exert any effort (e = 0). If e = 1, the probability of an accident is 0.5. If e = 0, the probability of an accident is 1. John's income without the accident is $100. In case of an accident, medical expenses will be $64. John utility of income is VI. The cost of effort, C(e), is 0 if effort is e = 0 and 1 if effort is e = is u(1, e) = VI – C(e). 1. John's utility function (a) What are the expected utility values that John would face when he exerts effort and when he does not exert effort? Based on your calculations, should he exert effort? Briefly explain the intuition behind his decision in one or two sentences. Now suppose there is a risk neutral insurance company. Suppose the insurance company cannot monitor whether John exerts effort or not. The insurance company considers two plan contracts. Contract Plan A: Premium: p = $36. Payout in the event of accident: d = $64 Contract Plan B: Premium: p =…
John is deciding whether to exert effort (e = 1) to avoid an accident at work or not exert any effort (e = 0). If e = 1, the probability of an accident is 0.5. If e = 0, the probability of an accident is 1. John's income without the accident is $100. In case of an accident, medical expenses will be $64. John utility of income is VI. The cost of effort, C(e), is 0 if effort is e = 0 and 1 if effort is e = 1. John's utility function is u(l, e) 3D VI — С(e). %3D (a) What are the expected utility values that John would face when he exerts effort and when he does not exert effort? Based on your calculations, should he exert effort? Briefly explain the intuition behind his decision in one or two sentences. Now suppose there is a risk neutral insurance company. Suppose the insurance company cannot monitor whether John exerts effort or not. The insurance company considers two plan contracts. Contract Plan A: Premium: p = $36. Payout in the event of accident: d = $64 Contract Plan B: Premium: p…
Jane spends $210 per month on wine and beer. Her utility function is given by TU = 100WB, where W represents the number of bottles of wine that she buys and B represents the number of cases of beer that she buys. If wine costs $10 per bottle and beer costs $15 per case, she will maximize utility by buying: 10 bottles of wine and 13.33 cases of beer. equal amounts of wine and beer. none of the above. 10.5 bottles of wine and 7 cases of beer. 2 bottles of wine and 3 cases of beer.
A4
Ann can finish a project either this week or next week. The delayed rewards are 10 in either case. (The project can be done only once or not at all).Next week is busy and the cost of finishing the project are lower this week. The immediate costs are 4 this week and 6 next week. Ann has a quasi-hyperbolic utility with δ= 1 and β <1. Imagine that Anndoes not finish the project this week. Then she should finish it next week A) if β >0.6; (B) if β >0.4; (C) only if β= 1; (D) for any β.
1. A standard model of choice under risk is Expected Utility Theory (EUT) in which preferences over lotteries that pay monetary prizes (x₁, x2, ..., xs) with probabilities (P1, P2, ..., Ps) with Eps = 1 are represented by the function L S (a) What does it mean to say that a function represents the consumer's prefer- ences? Σpsu(xs) Choice 1 8=1 (b) State and briefly comment on the axioms required for the EUT representation. (c) Consider the following experiment of decision making under risk in which sub- jects are asked which lottery they prefer in each of the following two choices: Lottery B 0 with prob. 0.01 10 with prob. 0.89 50 with prob. 0.10 Lottery D Choice 2 Lottery A 0 with prob. 0 10 with prob. 1 50 with prob. 0 Lottery C 0 with prob. 0.90 10 with prob. 0 50 with prob. 0.10 Suppose that the modal responses are Lottery A in Choice 1 and Lottery D in Choice 2. Assume that utility of zero is equal to zero and illustrate why it is not possible to reconcile these experimental…