Consider the following two gambles: Option A: you win $50 with probability 0.75 and lose $100 with probability 0.25. Option B: You win $100 with probability 0.25 and lose $50 with probability 0.75. Which option is preferred according to expected utility if i) You use an exponential utility function with R=5 ii) You use an exponential utility function with R=10 iii) You use an exponential utility function with R=100 iv) You use an exponential utility function with R=1000 v) You use an exponential utility function with R=10,000

Consider the following two gambles: Option A: you win $50 with probability 0.75 and lose $100 with probability 0.25. Option B: You win $100 with probability 0.25 and lose $50 with probability 0.75. Which option is preferred according to expected utility if i) You use an exponential utility function with R=5 ii) You use an exponential utility function with R=10 iii) You use an exponential utility function with R=100 iv) You use an exponential utility function with R=1000 v) You use an exponential utility function with R=10,000

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.3P

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You are considering two options for your next family vacation. You can visit Disney World or Chicago. Your utility from Disney World is 100 if the weather is clear, and 0 if it rains. Chicago is worth a utility of 70 if the weather is clear and a utility of 40 if the weather is rainy. Also assume that the chance of rain at Disney World is going to be 50% and the chance of rain in Chicago is 40%. As a utility maximizer, should you plan to go to Disney World or Chicago? (Explain using relevant equations)
2. Alice believes that her car would cost £12500 to replace if it was stolen or damaged. Based on crime statistics for the area she lives in, she believes that the probability of her car being stolen or damaged is 0.15. (i) Alice's utility function is given by U(w) = ln(w) for w > 0 and she as £35000 in the bank. Calculate how much Alice would be prepared to pay (in a single payment) to insure her car against theft or damage (ii) Repeat the calculation in the previous part but now assume Alice has £500000 in the bank.
2. Alex and Bill share a flat. Alex enjoys reading in silence, while Bill enjoys listening to loud music. Bill controls his music system, which can produce noise levels up to 100 Decibels. Bill has no cash but Alex has £100. Their utility functions are given by: UA = 10(100 – D)i + (100 – M), %3D Ug = 10(D)i + M, where D denotes the Decibel level chosen by Bill, and M denotes any cash given to Bill by Alex. (a) Explain how Bill's music level affects Alex. Find the contract curve between Alex and Bill. Why is there a unique Pareto efficient noise level? (b) What is the maximum amount Alex would be willing to pay Bill to turn down the music to the Pareto efficient level? What is the minimum amount Bill would be willing to accept in order to turn down the music to the Pareto efficient level? Can the Pareto efficient noise level be achieved through private bargaining?
A pirate is about to set sail on a 2-period journey (trip). He has 100 bags of barley (food). He must decide how much to consume in period 1 and how much to consume in period 2: (C1, c2). He gets all the barley in period 1 and none in period 2. Unfortunately, rats will eat 50% of any barley that he saves to consume in period 2. If the pirate's utility function is U(C1, C2) = C1C2, what levels of consumption does he choose in each period? (Hint: The "price" of barley in each period can be assumed to be 1.)
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Chris Traeger is trying to decide whether or not to purchase health insurance. Chris knows that if he is healthy, his wealth will be $2,000 this year. However, if he gets sick his wealth will only be $500. Chris knows the probability of getting sick is 40%. His utility function is written below. U = (2) What is utility if the individual purchases insurance at the actuarially fair price? 25.29 utils 26.46 utils 31.62 utils 18.97 utils
Assume that someone has inherited 2,000 bottles of wine from a rich uncle. He or she intends to drink these bottles over the next 40 years. Suppose that this person’s utility function for wine is given by u(c(t)) = (c(t))0.5, where c(t) is each instant t consumption of bottles. Assume also this person discounts future consumption at the rate δ = 0.05. Hence this person’s goal is to maximize 0ʃ40 e–0.05tu(c(t))dt = 0ʃ40 e–0.05t(c(t))0.5dt. Let x(t) represent the number of bottle of wine remaining at time t, constrained by x(0) = 2,000, x(40) = 0 and dx(t)/dt = – c(t): the stock of remaining bottles at each instant t is decreased by the consumption of bottles at instant t. The current value Hamiltonian expression yields: H = e–0.05t(c(t))0.5 + λ(– c(t)) + x(t)(dλ/dt). This person’s wine consumption decreases at a continuous rate of ??? percent per year. The number of bottles being consumed in the 30th year is approximately ???
3. Further questions Now, imagine that Port Chester decides to crack down on motorists who park illegally by increasing the number of officers issuing parking tickets (thus, raising the probability of a ticket). If the cost of a ticket is $100, and the opportunity cost for the average driver of searching for parking is $12, which of the following probabilities would make the average person stop parking illegally? Assume that people will not park illegally if the expected value of doing so is negative. Check all that apply. 13% 21% 9% 10% Alternatively, the city could hold the number of officers constant and discourage parking violations by raising the fine for illegal parking. Suppose the average probability of getting caught for parking illegally is currently 10% citywide, and the average opportunity cost of parking is, again, $12. The fine that would make the average person indifferent between searching for parking and parking illegally is 5 park illegally if the expected value of…
1. Now, imagine that Port Chester decides to crack down on motorists who park illegally by increasing the number of officers issuing parking tickets (thus, raising the probability of a ticket). If the cost of a ticket is $100, and the opportunity cost for the average driver of searching for parking is $12, which of the following probabilities would make the average person stop parking illegally? Assume that people will not park illegally if the expected value of doing so is negative. Check all that apply. A. 9% B. 18% C. 17% D. 10% 2. Alternatively, the city could hold the number of officers constant and discourage parking violations by raising the fine for illegal parking. Suppose the average probability of getting caught for parking illegally is currently 10% citywide, and the average opportunity cost of parking is, again, $12. The fine that would make the average person indifferent between searching for parking and parking illegally is ____ , assuming that people will not…
Zeynep is at the supermarket buying her bi-weekly groceries. As she arrived at the store right before closing, not much is left on the shelves; so her purchases are limited to beef, B, and an assortment of organic vegetables, V. Beef costs £50/kg and vegetables Ł10/kg. Her utility function is expressed as U(B,V) = B0-6v0.3. She has ±150 to spend. Please answer the following questions using this information: A) Given the vegetables cost less than beef, explain why Zeynep would not only buy vegetables. B) Write Zeynep's constrained maximization problem (objective function subject to her budget constraint). C) Using the Lagrangian technique, find how much beef and vegetables would Zeynep buy? D) Show that for the preferences represented as above, demand for beef is a function of only its own price, pg, and income, m, but not the price of vegetables, py. Note: Rather than using the given prices and income, use PB, Py and m. Find and comment on the comparative statics, i.e., how do changes…
QUESTION 5 A consumer has utility u (I) = √I and income $1,600. The cost of going to the doctor is $1,150, and the cost of going to the gym is $150. If the consumer goes to the gym, the probability of getting sick is 20%; if she does not go to the gym, the probability of getting sick is 80%. When sick, the consumer must go to the doctor. An insurance company is offering a health insurance plan with an insurance premium of $230 and a co-pay of $110 (that is, the consumer must pay the $110 if she goes to the doctor). a) The consumer's expected utility from purchasing this insurance and going to the gym is b) The consumer's expected utility from purchasing this insurance and not going to the gym is c) In this market, the $110 copay ✓ QUESTION 6 A salesperson is trying to sell ca Given her effort e, with probabili The dealership pays her a bonu a) Given the bonus b, the salesp b) Suppose the dealership pays *Select Answer* 34.6061 35.7999 37.0135 43.0338 42.4303 46.2601 fixes the adverse…