Question 2: Consider the financial-market imperfection model with asymmetric information. The firm needs one unit of capital to start a project that will produce y distributed uniformly over [0, 2y]. The firm owns W<1, and needs to borrow 1-W from the bank. There are infinite number of banks providing infinite amount of capital. The risk-free interest is r. We assume p1+r. 1) Suppose both the firm and the bank can observe y perfectly. Can you propose a feasible contract that makes borrowing possible? 2) Suppose the bank can only observe y with a cost C. Can you propose a feasible contract that makes borrowing possible? You can make your own assumptions on parameter values. 3) Based on your answer to 2), mark the area in a W-y diagram that represents the collection of (W, y) value combinations with which an investment project will be funded.

Essentials Of Investments
11th Edition
ISBN:9781260013924
Author:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Publisher:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Chapter1: Investments: Background And Issues
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Question 2: Consider the financial-market imperfection model with asymmetric information.
The firm needs one unit of capital to start a project that will produce y distributed uniformly
over [0, 2y). The firm owns W<1, and needs to borrow 1-W from the bank. There are infinite
number of banks providing infinite amount of capital. The risk-free interest is r. We assume
p1+r.
1) Suppose both the firm and the bank can observe y perfectly. Can you propose a feasible
contract that makes borrowing possible?
2) Suppose the bank can only observe y with a cost C. Can you propose a feasible contract
that makes borrowing possible? You can make your own assumptions on parameter
values.
3) Based on your answer to 2), mark the area in a W-ydiagram that represents the
collection of (W, r) value combinations with which an investment project will be funded.
Transcribed Image Text:Question 2: Consider the financial-market imperfection model with asymmetric information. The firm needs one unit of capital to start a project that will produce y distributed uniformly over [0, 2y). The firm owns W<1, and needs to borrow 1-W from the bank. There are infinite number of banks providing infinite amount of capital. The risk-free interest is r. We assume p1+r. 1) Suppose both the firm and the bank can observe y perfectly. Can you propose a feasible contract that makes borrowing possible? 2) Suppose the bank can only observe y with a cost C. Can you propose a feasible contract that makes borrowing possible? You can make your own assumptions on parameter values. 3) Based on your answer to 2), mark the area in a W-ydiagram that represents the collection of (W, r) value combinations with which an investment project will be funded.
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