Question: 1 Consider the following simultaneous move game: Player 1 selects rows and player 2 selects columns in a simultaneous move game. For every outcome, payoffs for player 1 are given by the first entry and payoffs for player 2 by the second. P1\P2 | A | B | C | D | 1 | (5,5) | (7,4) | (7,5) | (1,2) | 2 | (7,2) | (7,3) | (5,1) | (2,3) | 3 | (1,2) | (6,9) | (8,0) | (8,8) | The Nash Equilibrium is: Choices: A. (2,B) B. (3,D) C. (3,B) D. (1,C) Question: 2 In the patent pooling model, if there are four inputs that are required for production of the final goods and each one is produced by a patent-holding monopolist then 1. At the Nash Equilibrium the Lerner Index for the industry is Choices: A. Half as high as the Lerner index that would arise... B. Twice as high as the Lerner Index that would arise... C. Four times higher than the Lerner Index that we... D. Four times lower than the Lerner Index that we... 2. If the market for the final good were a Court Oligopoly instead of perfectly competitive then at the Nash Equilibrium Choices: A. The Lerner Index would be the same as with perfect competition in the final good because to... B. The lerner index would be lower than with perfect competition in the final good because to... C. The Lerner Index would be the same as with perfect competition in the final good because to... D. The Lerner Index would be higher than with perfect competition in the final good because to...
Economics: Industrial Economics
Question: 1
Consider the following simultaneous move game:
Player 1 selects rows and player 2 selects columns in a simultaneous move game. For every outcome, payoffs for player 1 are given by the first entry and payoffs for player 2 by the second.
P1\P2 | A | B | C | D |
1 | (5,5) | (7,4) | (7,5) | (1,2) |
2 | (7,2) | (7,3) | (5,1) | (2,3) |
3 | (1,2) | (6,9) | (8,0) | (8,8) |
The Nash Equilibrium is:
Choices:
A. (2,B)
B. (3,D)
C. (3,B)
D. (1,C)
Question: 2
In the patent pooling model, if there are four inputs that are required for production of the final goods and each one is produced by a patent-holding monopolist then
1. At the Nash Equilibrium the Lerner Index for the industry is
Choices:
A. Half as high as the Lerner index that would arise...
B. Twice as high as the Lerner Index that would arise...
C. Four times higher than the Lerner Index that we...
D. Four times lower than the Lerner Index that we...
2. If the market for the final good were a Court Oligopoly instead of
Choices:
A. The Lerner Index would be the same as with perfect competition in the final good because to...
B. The lerner index would be lower than with perfect competition in the final good because to...
C. The Lerner Index would be the same as with perfect competition in the final good because to...
D. The Lerner Index would be higher than with perfect competition in the final good because to...
Thank you for your support and help Study Agent!
Trending now
This is a popular solution!
Step by step
Solved in 3 steps
