Q. 2. Consider the game of voters participation. Two candidates A (with two suporters) and B (with remaining three voters supporting him) compete. Voters have the option of voting for the preferred candidate or abstain. If a voter decides to vote then her payoffs are 2-e, 1- c and - c if her preferred candidate wins, ties or loose respectively. Her payoffs are 2, 1 and 0 for the above outcomes if she abstains. Show that there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which both supporters of A votes with probability p (0
Q. 2. Consider the game of voters participation. Two candidates A (with two suporters) and B (with remaining three voters supporting him) compete. Voters have the option of voting for the preferred candidate or abstain. If a voter decides to vote then her payoffs are 2-e, 1- c and - c if her preferred candidate wins, ties or loose respectively. Her payoffs are 2, 1 and 0 for the above outcomes if she abstains. Show that there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which both supporters of A votes with probability p (0
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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![Q. 2. Consider the game of voters participation. Two candidates A
(with two suporters) and B (with remaining three voters supporting
him) compete.
Voters have the option of voting for the preferred candidate or
abstain. If a voter decides to vote then her payoffs are 2-e, 1- c and - c
if her preferred candidate wins, ties or loose respectively. Her payoffs
are 2, i and 0 for the above outcomes if she abstains.
Show that there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which both
supporters of A votes with probability p (0 <p<1), two of the supporters
of B votes with certainty while the other one abstain.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F6dd1323f-cbe7-42e3-acdb-6440d0db9106%2F9acbffee-8a39-4484-9b4c-3d1f1356b772%2F5zsemnv_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Q. 2. Consider the game of voters participation. Two candidates A
(with two suporters) and B (with remaining three voters supporting
him) compete.
Voters have the option of voting for the preferred candidate or
abstain. If a voter decides to vote then her payoffs are 2-e, 1- c and - c
if her preferred candidate wins, ties or loose respectively. Her payoffs
are 2, i and 0 for the above outcomes if she abstains.
Show that there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which both
supporters of A votes with probability p (0 <p<1), two of the supporters
of B votes with certainty while the other one abstain.
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