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- A client (the principal) is trying to determine the best possible contract to enter into with her favoring the client is x and the probability of winning is 8. lawyer (the agent). The principal makes the following assumptions: the dollar amount of a judgment The lawyer has offered to () work for a fixed fee of F. (i) pay the client a fixed fee of F and keep the remainder of the judgment, and (ii) work for a contingent fee or a share of the contract with t lawyer's share being a If the principal is highly risk-averse and is interested in production efficiency she will choose option i option i option iTwo employees witness fraud committed in their firm. Each has two pure strategies: to become a whistleblower and report a crime, or not to report a crime. Each employee gets a payoff of 1 if the crime is reported by someone (it does not matter if both or only one employee reports). However, reporting the crime is costly. An employee who reports has to pay the cost of reporting equal to 0.5-0.25*d, where d=1 if the other employee also reports, and d=0 otherwise. Suppose that employees simultaneously decide to report or not. There is a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game where each employee reports with the same positive probability less than 1. What is the probability that the crime is reported by at least one employee in such an equilibrium? ________5. You are a risk-averse decision maker with a utility function U(1) = VI, where I denotes your income. Your income is $100,000 (thus, I=100). However, there is a 0.2 chance that you will have an accident that results in a loss of $10,000. Now, suppose you have the opportunity to purchase an insurance policy that fully insures you against this loss (i.e., that pays you $10,000 in the event that you incur the loss). What is the highest premium that you would be willing to pay for this insurance policy?
- Question 3: Jane has utility function over her net income U(Y)=Y2 a. What are Jane's preferences towards risk? Is she risk averse, risk neutral or risk loving? [Briefly explain your answer] b. Jane drives to work every day and she spends a lot of money on parking meters. She is considering of cheating and not paying for the parking. However, she knows that there is a 1/4 probability of being caught on a given day if she cheats, and that the cost of the ticket is $36. Her daily income is $100. What is the maximum amount of she will be willing to pay for one day parking? c. Paul also faces the same dilemma every single day. However, he has a utility function U(Y)-Y. His daily income is also $100. What is Paul's preference towards risk? Is he risk averse, risk neutral or risk loving? d. If the price of one day parking is $9.25, will Paul cheat or pay the parking meter? Will Jane cheat or pay the parking meter?Q2 Janet offers her friend Sam (who has identical preferences and initial wealth) the following proposition: They buy the ticket together, and share the cost and proceeds equally. Q3 Sam has another idea: They buy two tickets (that have independent outcomes) and share the costs and proceeds equally.A buyer wants to purchase a house from a seller. Let v be the quality of this house. The quality v is known to the seller but unobservable to the buyer. The buyer thinks the chance that v=$1k is 20%, v=$10k is 40%, and v=$50k is 40%. The seller’s valuation of the house is v and the buyer’s valuation of the house is 2v a) Suppose both the buyer and the seller see the value of v . Also suppose the transaction price equals the value of v (i.e. if =10k, then the buyer pays 10k for the house). Calculate the buyer’s expected profit before seeing the value of b) Suppose only the seller sees v. Also suppose the buyer is allowed to make any offer to the seller and the seller accepts it if the offered price is above or equals to v. What is the buyer’s profit maximizing offer? What is the buyer’s maximum profit? c) Base on your answers from (a) and (b), what is the value of information (i.e. the benefits of seeing the value of ) to the buyer?
- Let b(p,s,t) be the bet that pays out s with probability p and t with probability 1−p. We make the three following statements: S1: The CME for b is the value m such that u(m)=E[u(b(p,s,t))]. S2: A risk averse attitude corresponds to the case CME smaller than E[b(p,s,t))]. S3: A risk seeking attitude corresponds to a convex utility function. Are these statements true or false?Choice under uncertainty. Consider a coin-toss game in which the player gets $30 if they win, and $5 if they lose. The probability of winning is 50%. (a) Alan is (just) willing to pay $15 to play this game. What is Alan’s attitude to risk? Show your work.(b) Assume a market with many identical Alans, who are all forced to pay $15 to play this coin-toss game. An insurer offers an insurance policy to protect the Alans from the risk. What would be the fair (zero profit) premium on this policy? i need help with question B please.!
- Firms A and B are contemplating whether or not to invest in R&D. Each has two options: “Invest” and “Abstain.” A firm that invests will invent product X with a probability of 0.5, whereas a firm that abstains is incapable of invention. Investment costs $6. If a firm doesn’t invent X, it makes $0 in revenue. If a firm invests and is the only one to invent X, it becomes a monopolist and generates $20 in revenue. If both firms invent X, each firm becomes a duopolist, and generates $8 in revenue. Revenues are gross figures (i.e. they are not net of investment costs), and there are no costs besides investments costs (i.e. no variable cost of production etc.). The firms are risk-neutral entities, and are uninformed of each other’s investment decisions. The “research and development” game is best analyzed as a simultaneous move game, because the parties lack information about each other’s investment decisions. Find the Nash Equilibria (or Equilibrium) of the “research and development”…1. Mr. Smith can cause an accident, which entails a monetary loss of $1000 to Ms. Adams. The likelihood of the accident depends on the precaution decisions by both individuals. Specifically, each individual can choose either "low" or "high" precaution, with the low precaution requiring no cost and the high precaution requiring the effort cost of $200 to the individual who chooses the high precaution. The following table describes the probability of an accident for each combination of the precaution choices by the two individuals. Adams chooses low precaution Adams chooses high precaution Smith chooses low precaution Smith chooses high precaution 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.1 1) What is the socially efficient outcome? For each of the following tort rules, (i) construct a table describing the individuals' payoffs under different precaution pairs and (ii) find the equilibrium precaution choices by the individuals. 2) a) No liability b) Strict liability (with full compensation) c) Negligence rule (with…Max Pentridge is thinking of starting a pinball palace near a large Melbourne university. His utility is given by u(W) = 1 - (5,000/W), where W is his wealth. Max's total wealth is $15,000. With probability p = 0.9 the palace will succeed and Max's wealth will grow from $15,000 to $x. With probability 1 - p the palace will be a failure and he’ll lose $10,000, so that his wealth will be just $5,000. What is the smallest value of x that would be sufficient to make Max want to invest in the pinball palace rather than have a wealth of $15,000 with certainty? (Please round your final answer to the whole dollar, if necessary)
