Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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![Problem 3 Consider a firm that employs a worker on a project. If the project succeeds,
it generates a revenue of a > 0 for the firm. If it fails, the revenue is zero. The worker
0, the project succeeds with
1, the project succeeds with probability p1 > p0. The firm
does not observe the actual effort, only the whether the project succeeds or not. Hence, it
can choose an effort level e = 0 or e = 1. If he chooses e =
probability po;
if he chooses e =
sets a wage schedule such that it pays a wage of ws in case the project succeeds, and of wp
in case of failure. Both wages cannot be negative. The worker's utility is given by w – ce,
with a > c> 0. The firm maximizes expected profits. Both players are risk neutral. The
game proceeds as follows: Step 1: The firm sets the wage schedule Step 2: The worker
decides about his effort. Step 3: Nature decides whether the project fails or not (with
probabilities depending on the effort chosen in step 2), and the payoffs are realized.
1. Write down the game tree
2. Find the players' payoff functions.
3. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F480c45e9-e1da-442d-94e8-f63f3bdf7c75%2F063c9916-b78a-4fd4-8c7d-c4ac6a7607de%2Fsj0wt1r_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Problem 3 Consider a firm that employs a worker on a project. If the project succeeds,
it generates a revenue of a > 0 for the firm. If it fails, the revenue is zero. The worker
0, the project succeeds with
1, the project succeeds with probability p1 > p0. The firm
does not observe the actual effort, only the whether the project succeeds or not. Hence, it
can choose an effort level e = 0 or e = 1. If he chooses e =
probability po;
if he chooses e =
sets a wage schedule such that it pays a wage of ws in case the project succeeds, and of wp
in case of failure. Both wages cannot be negative. The worker's utility is given by w – ce,
with a > c> 0. The firm maximizes expected profits. Both players are risk neutral. The
game proceeds as follows: Step 1: The firm sets the wage schedule Step 2: The worker
decides about his effort. Step 3: Nature decides whether the project fails or not (with
probabilities depending on the effort chosen in step 2), and the payoffs are realized.
1. Write down the game tree
2. Find the players' payoff functions.
3. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium.
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