Please read the case from the image attached and write a discourse on the following questions below. Thank you.    Topic:  Do people who speak different languages think differently?   What are: The views expressed by the Psychologists on the topic. The student's understanding of the content of the topic. Reasons for agreement with or disagreement with the content shared by the Psychologists. The student's conclusions formed from the information gleaned from the content. The student's evaluation of the content shared about the topic.

Ciccarelli: Psychology_5 (5th Edition)
5th Edition
ISBN:9780134477961
Author:Saundra K. Ciccarelli, J. Noland White
Publisher:Saundra K. Ciccarelli, J. Noland White
Chapter1: The Science Of Psychology
Section: Chapter Questions
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Please read the case from the image attached and write a discourse on the following questions below. Thank you. 
 
Topic:  Do people who speak different languages think differently?
 
What are:
  • The views expressed by the Psychologists on the topic.
  • The student's understanding of the content of the topic.
  • Reasons for agreement with or disagreement with the content shared by the Psychologists.
  • The student's conclusions formed from the information gleaned from the content.
  • The student's evaluation of the content shared about the topic.
SEEING BOTH SIDES
DO PEOPLE WHO SPEAK DIFFERENT
LANGUAGES THINK DIFFERENTLY?
How is language related to thought?
encode space. In a series of experiments, Tseltal speakers were
shown to remember spatal soenes in terms of absolute co
ordinates rather than body-centered (et/right) spatial concepts;
speakers of Dutch, a language which, ike English, possesses
bft/right terms, showed the opposite preference (Levinson,
2003).
The precise interpretation of these findings is greatly debated.
Firstly, studies such as the above simply show that linguistic
behavior and cognitive preferences can co-vary, not that lan-
Ama Papafragou, University of Delaware
How is language related to thaught? Do people who speak df-
ferent anguages think diferently? According to one theory,
language offers the concepts and mechanisms for representing
and making sense of our experience, thereby radically shaping
the way we think. This strong view, famously associated with the
writings of Benjamin Wharf (Whorf, 1956), is certainly wrong.
Firstly, people possess many concepts which their language
does not directly encode. For instance, the Mundurukú, an
guage causes cognition to differ across various linguistic pop-
ulations. Furthermore, some of the reported cognitive differences
may have been due to ambiguities in the way instructions to
study participants were phrased. When Japanese and English
speakers were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to 7, how ikely
Amazonian indigene group, can recognize squares and tra-
pezoids even though their language has no rich geometric terms
(Dehaene, et al., 2006). Similarly, members of the Pirahă com-
munity in Brazil whose anguage acks number words can nev-
they were to classify a novel specimen as a kind of object or a
kind of substance, their ratings converged (Li, et al., in press).
Similarly, when Tseltal speakers were given implicit cues about
how to solve spatial tasks, they were able to use left/right rea-
soning; in fact, on some tasks, they were more accurate when
using leftright concepts compared to absolute co-ordinates,
contrary to what one might expect on the basis of how Tseltal
encodes space (Li, et al, 2005). These data show that human
cognitive mechanisms are fexible rather than streamlined by
inguistic terminology.
Other studies have confirmed that cross-linguistic differences
do not necessarily lead to cogntive differences. For instance,
memory and categorization of mation events, such as an air-
ertheless perform numerical computations involving large sets
(even though they have trouble retaining this information in
memory, Frank, et al., 2008). Secondy, there are often broad
similarities in the ways different languages carve up domains of
experience. For instance, crucial properties of color vocabularies
across anguages appear to be shaped by universal perceptual
constraints (Regier et al., 2007). Aso many languages seem to
label basic tastes by distinct words (e.g., sweet, salt, sour and
bitter; Majid & Levinson, 2008). The presence of constraints on
cross-linguistic variation suggests that language categories are
shaped by cognitive biases shared across humans.
A weaker version of the Whorfian view maintains that, even
plane fying over a house, seem to be independent of the way
anguages encode motion (Papafragou et al., 2002). Relatedly,
though language does not completely determine thought, it still
affects people's habitual thought patterns by promoting the
salience of some categories and downgrading others. One ineof
studies set out to examine how Engish and Japanese speakers
draw the conceptual distincion between objects and sub-
similarity judgments for containers such as jars, bottles and cups
converge in speakers of different languages despite words for
such containers varying cross-linguistically (Malt et al., 1999). In
a striking recent demonstration, using eye tracking methods,
Engish and Greek speakers were found to attend to different
parts of an event while they were getting ready to describe the
event verbally; however, when preparing to memorize the event
stances. Engish distinguishes between count nouns (a pyramic)
and mass nouns (cork), while Japanese does not (all nouns
behave like mass nouns. When taught names for novel simple
exemplars (e.g., a cork pyramid), which could in principle be
considered either objects or substances, English speakers pre-
dominantly took the name to refer to the object (pyramid") but
Japanese speakers were at chance between the object or the
for a later memory task, speakers of the two languages per-
formed identically in terms of how they allocated attention,
presumably because they relied on processes of event per-
ception that are independent of language (Papatragou et al.,
2008).
This research suggests that language can be usefuly thought
of as an additional route for encoding experience. Rather than
permanently reshaping the processes supporting perception and
substance ('cork) construal (Imai & Gentner, 1997). These
findings have been interpreted as evidence that the linguistic
count/mass distinction affects how people draw the conceptual
object/substance distinction (at least for indeterminate cases).
Another set of studes focused on speakers of Tseltal Mayan
living in Mexico, whose language acks left/right terms for giving
directions and locating things in the environment. Tsetal
speakers cannot say things such as 'the cup is to my left';
cognitive processing, language offers an altenative, often
optionally recruited system of encoding, organizing and tracking
experience. The precise interplay between linguistic and cogni-
five functions wil continue to be a topic of intense experimen-
tation and theorizing for years to come.
instead they use absolute co-ordihates (e.g., 'north' or 'south') to
Transcribed Image Text:SEEING BOTH SIDES DO PEOPLE WHO SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES THINK DIFFERENTLY? How is language related to thought? encode space. In a series of experiments, Tseltal speakers were shown to remember spatal soenes in terms of absolute co ordinates rather than body-centered (et/right) spatial concepts; speakers of Dutch, a language which, ike English, possesses bft/right terms, showed the opposite preference (Levinson, 2003). The precise interpretation of these findings is greatly debated. Firstly, studies such as the above simply show that linguistic behavior and cognitive preferences can co-vary, not that lan- Ama Papafragou, University of Delaware How is language related to thaught? Do people who speak df- ferent anguages think diferently? According to one theory, language offers the concepts and mechanisms for representing and making sense of our experience, thereby radically shaping the way we think. This strong view, famously associated with the writings of Benjamin Wharf (Whorf, 1956), is certainly wrong. Firstly, people possess many concepts which their language does not directly encode. For instance, the Mundurukú, an guage causes cognition to differ across various linguistic pop- ulations. Furthermore, some of the reported cognitive differences may have been due to ambiguities in the way instructions to study participants were phrased. When Japanese and English speakers were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to 7, how ikely Amazonian indigene group, can recognize squares and tra- pezoids even though their language has no rich geometric terms (Dehaene, et al., 2006). Similarly, members of the Pirahă com- munity in Brazil whose anguage acks number words can nev- they were to classify a novel specimen as a kind of object or a kind of substance, their ratings converged (Li, et al., in press). Similarly, when Tseltal speakers were given implicit cues about how to solve spatial tasks, they were able to use left/right rea- soning; in fact, on some tasks, they were more accurate when using leftright concepts compared to absolute co-ordinates, contrary to what one might expect on the basis of how Tseltal encodes space (Li, et al, 2005). These data show that human cognitive mechanisms are fexible rather than streamlined by inguistic terminology. Other studies have confirmed that cross-linguistic differences do not necessarily lead to cogntive differences. For instance, memory and categorization of mation events, such as an air- ertheless perform numerical computations involving large sets (even though they have trouble retaining this information in memory, Frank, et al., 2008). Secondy, there are often broad similarities in the ways different languages carve up domains of experience. For instance, crucial properties of color vocabularies across anguages appear to be shaped by universal perceptual constraints (Regier et al., 2007). Aso many languages seem to label basic tastes by distinct words (e.g., sweet, salt, sour and bitter; Majid & Levinson, 2008). The presence of constraints on cross-linguistic variation suggests that language categories are shaped by cognitive biases shared across humans. A weaker version of the Whorfian view maintains that, even plane fying over a house, seem to be independent of the way anguages encode motion (Papafragou et al., 2002). Relatedly, though language does not completely determine thought, it still affects people's habitual thought patterns by promoting the salience of some categories and downgrading others. One ineof studies set out to examine how Engish and Japanese speakers draw the conceptual distincion between objects and sub- similarity judgments for containers such as jars, bottles and cups converge in speakers of different languages despite words for such containers varying cross-linguistically (Malt et al., 1999). In a striking recent demonstration, using eye tracking methods, Engish and Greek speakers were found to attend to different parts of an event while they were getting ready to describe the event verbally; however, when preparing to memorize the event stances. Engish distinguishes between count nouns (a pyramic) and mass nouns (cork), while Japanese does not (all nouns behave like mass nouns. When taught names for novel simple exemplars (e.g., a cork pyramid), which could in principle be considered either objects or substances, English speakers pre- dominantly took the name to refer to the object (pyramid") but Japanese speakers were at chance between the object or the for a later memory task, speakers of the two languages per- formed identically in terms of how they allocated attention, presumably because they relied on processes of event per- ception that are independent of language (Papatragou et al., 2008). This research suggests that language can be usefuly thought of as an additional route for encoding experience. Rather than permanently reshaping the processes supporting perception and substance ('cork) construal (Imai & Gentner, 1997). These findings have been interpreted as evidence that the linguistic count/mass distinction affects how people draw the conceptual object/substance distinction (at least for indeterminate cases). Another set of studes focused on speakers of Tseltal Mayan living in Mexico, whose language acks left/right terms for giving directions and locating things in the environment. Tsetal speakers cannot say things such as 'the cup is to my left'; cognitive processing, language offers an altenative, often optionally recruited system of encoding, organizing and tracking experience. The precise interplay between linguistic and cogni- five functions wil continue to be a topic of intense experimen- tation and theorizing for years to come. instead they use absolute co-ordihates (e.g., 'north' or 'south') to
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