Player 1 and player 2 are playing a simultaneous-move one-shot game, where player 1 can move "up" or "down" and player 2 can move "left" or "right." The payoffs for the game are shown in the payoff matrix. The first number of each cell represents player 1's payoff, and the second number is player 2's. Use the matrix to answer the questions below. Player 1 2nd attempt Part 1 Part 2 Which of the following outcomes is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game? Up Down p= (1-P) = q= Left -16, -18 -20,7 Choose one or more: A. There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game. B. Player 1 plays up; player 2 plays left. C. Player 1 plays up; player 2 plays right. Part 3 Player 2 □ D. Player 1 plays down; player 2 plays left. D E. Player 1 plays down; player 2 plays right. Right -17, -20 -14, 10 Suppose player 1 assigns probability p to playing up and (1-p) to playing down. What do p and (1-p) have to be such that player 2 is indifferent between playing left and right? Round all answers to two decimal places. (1-q) = Suppose player 2 assigns probability q to playing left and (1-q) to playing right. What do q and (1-q) have to be such that player 1 is indifferent between playing up and down? Round all answers to two decimal places.
Player 1 and player 2 are playing a simultaneous-move one-shot game, where player 1 can move "up" or "down" and player 2 can move "left" or "right." The payoffs for the game are shown in the payoff matrix. The first number of each cell represents player 1's payoff, and the second number is player 2's. Use the matrix to answer the questions below. Player 1 2nd attempt Part 1 Part 2 Which of the following outcomes is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game? Up Down p= (1-P) = q= Left -16, -18 -20,7 Choose one or more: A. There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game. B. Player 1 plays up; player 2 plays left. C. Player 1 plays up; player 2 plays right. Part 3 Player 2 □ D. Player 1 plays down; player 2 plays left. D E. Player 1 plays down; player 2 plays right. Right -17, -20 -14, 10 Suppose player 1 assigns probability p to playing up and (1-p) to playing down. What do p and (1-p) have to be such that player 2 is indifferent between playing left and right? Round all answers to two decimal places. (1-q) = Suppose player 2 assigns probability q to playing left and (1-q) to playing right. What do q and (1-q) have to be such that player 1 is indifferent between playing up and down? Round all answers to two decimal places.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
Transcribed Image Text:Player 1 and player 2 are playing a simultaneous-move one-shot game, where player 1 can move "up" or "down" and player 2 can move "left" or "right"
The payoffs for the game are shown in the payoff matrix. The first number of each cell represents player 1's payoff, and the second number is player
2's. Use the matrix to answer the questions below.
Player 1
2nd attempt
Part 1
Part 2
Which of the following outcomes is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game?
P =
(1-P) =
Up
Down
Part 3
9=
Left
-16, -18
-20,7
Choose one or more:
A. There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game.
OB. Player 1 plays up; player 2 plays left.
OC. Player 1 plays up; player 2 plays right.
□ D. Player 1 plays down; player 2 plays left.
O E. Player 1 plays down; player 2 plays right.
Player 2
Suppose player 1 assigns probability p to playing up and (1 - p) to playing down. What do p and (1-p) have to be such that player 2 is
indifferent between playing left and right? Round all answers to two decimal places.
Right
-17, -20
-14, 10
(1-q) =
Suppose player 2 assigns probability to playing left and (1-q) to playing right. What do q and (1 - g) have to be such that player 1 is
indifferent between playing up and down? Round all answers to two decimal places.
Expert Solution
This question has been solved!
Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.
Step by step
Solved in 5 steps
Knowledge Booster
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.Recommended textbooks for you
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education