Part 1 ( See Hint Two Cournot duopolists compete in a market with inverse demand given by p = 152.00 - 20, where p is the per-unit price, qi is the output for firm i (either firm 1 or firm 2), and Q = 91 + 92. Firm 1 has a cost function of c₁ (91) = 2₁₁ and firm 2 has a cost function of c2(92) = 392. Assume no fixed costs. What is the optimal output for firm 1? (Round to two decimals if necessary.) What is the optimal output for firm 2? (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Part 21 What is the equilibrium price in this market? $ (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Part 3 What is the profit for each firm? Firm 1 profit: $ (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Firm 2 profit: $ (Round to two decimals if necessary.) See Hint See Hint