Offer Rebate No Rebate XYZ Corp Offer Rebate 20. 10 30,0 No Rebate 12. 16 20,4 Which of the following is true about the game above? Lutfen birini seçin: O A. Both ABC and XYZ offer a rebate as a dominant strategy O BABC's dominant strategy is not offer a rebate. OC ABCS dominant strategy is to offer a rebate, OD XYZ's dominant strategy is to offer a rebate.

Offer Rebate No Rebate XYZ Corp Offer Rebate 20. 10 30,0 No Rebate 12. 16 20,4 Which of the following is true about the game above? Lutfen birini seçin: O A. Both ABC and XYZ offer a rebate as a dominant strategy O BABC's dominant strategy is not offer a rebate. OC ABCS dominant strategy is to offer a rebate, OD XYZ's dominant strategy is to offer a rebate.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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2. For the game illustrated in the figure below, find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria and mixed- strategy Nash equilibria (Hint: apply IDSDS first) Player 2 W y 0,20 А 5,30 10,15 Player 1 В 0,5 15,5 5,10 0,5 0,30 -10,5
in this game table, Pepsi's payout is on the left and Sam's Choice's is on the ight. Is the Nash equilibrium a prisoner's dilemma? Pepsi High Low Sam's Choice High 110, 20 60, 10 Low 80, 40 70, 30 O No, it is not because both firms played their dominant strategies. O Yes, it is because the combined payoff for the two firms is lower than another outcome. O Yes, it is because at least one of the firms ends up with the lowest possible payoff. O No, it is not because at least one firm has achieved its highest possible payoff.
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Little Kona is a small coffee company that is considering entering a market dominated by Big Brew. Each company's profit depends on whether Little Kona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price: Little Kona True True or False: Only Little Kona has a dominant strategy in this game. False Big Brew High Price Low Price Enter $2 million, $3 million $2 million, $1 million Don't Enter 50, 58 million $0, $3 million Which of the following outcomes represent a Nash equilibrium in this case? Check all that apply. Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona does not enter. Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona does not enter. Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona enters. Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona enters. Big Brew threatens Little Kona by saying, "If you enter, we're going to set a low price, so you had better stay out." Thin True or False: Little Kona should believe the threat.
MCQ 26 In game theory, a dominant strategy can best be described as: A a strategy played by a dominant firm to raise its market share В a strategy played by a firm to dominate its rivals C I do not want to answer this question. D all the answers to this question are correct E a strategy that leaves every player in a game better off F a strategy that is optimal for a player, irrespective of what the other players do
am. 112.
Wal-Mart's dominant strategy is to pick a price of $. Target Price = $30 Price = $17 %3D What is the Nash equilibrium for this game? $6,000 $1,500 O A. The Nash equilibrium is for Target to choose a price of $17 and Wal-Mart to choose a price of $30. Price = $30 $6,000 $11,000 O B. The Nash equilibrium is for Target and Wal-Mart to both choose a price of $30. Wal - Mart C. The Nash equilibrium is for Target to choose a price of $30 and Wal-Mart to choose a price of $17. $11,000 $4,500 Price = $17 %3D $1,500 $4,500 O D. The Nash equilibrium is for Target and Wal-Mart to both choose a price of $17. South OE. O E. A Nash equilibrium does not exist for this game.
3. Consider the following payoff matrix for a complementary investment game: WCG a. Do Not Invest C. Invest b. What is the Nash equilibrium? Do Not Invest What is the maximin solution? 0 Does either firm have a dominant strategy? -100 BB 0 0 Invest 0 20 d. How do your answers change if BB loses 5 if it invests and WCG doesn't invest? 110 10
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Peter X O a. 3 O b. 2 O c. more than 3 O d. 1 O e. none Y Z R 9,6 6,6 9,7 How many (pure strategy) Nash equilibria does this game have? Sarah S 4,4 7,6 1,5 T 6,-3 2,2 6,7
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