O Now lets chauge the setup from (omot camputitin from Coomet computitin to Bertrand Competitin, while maintaining all afther ayump tius. What is He equilibium price? O Suppon the two firms engaga in Batrand (ompetition. What is the hijhest price that Fim 1 s for He new willing to foy

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Chapter7: Production, Costs, And Industry Structure
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Please I need help for part E and F. I have the intuition in mind but I am not too sure about it. I thought about reversing the inverse demand function given so it now looks like Q = 30 - P. Since Bertrand is concerned about prices, then we can solve for p1 and p2 using the reversed of the inverse demand function (P = 30 - Q). From here, we use the same familiar procedure to solve for the equilibrium price which I think will be the same.

Please help explain if my understanding is correct and provide further explanation for me. Thanks for the help.

Consi der Hhe fallowing
» The inverse femand function is givan by p= 30-@
Cournet medel.
where Q = E,+
* Firm 13 marginal cost is $6lei=6). Fivm 2 uses a nem
techaulagy
There is no
that it's marginal cost is $3 (6=3).
fixed cort
So
The fwo fims chooce thair
and Compete only
Jame).
Answer the follming puestions.
O Derive Firm 1 amd Firm 2% vation furtions reupertivaly.
o Solve Hhe Harh equilibrium ( ", q")
O What is He equilibrinm
level for eah firm.
quenti tias simultaneculy
(So it's a
one- shot simultaneaus
once
price and what is Hhe profit
Suppore there is
Iim 2. Wlhat is the highert price that Firm I is
willing to paj for this new
o Mow let's chauge the setup from Coumet campetition
to Bertrand Competitin, while maintaining all efther
aJAump tins. What is He equilibium price?
O Suppon the fwe finms engage in Betrand (ompetition
What is the hijhut price that Fim 1 o milling
for He new feihnly?
* market for the teihue lagy uped by
to
Transcribed Image Text:Consi der Hhe fallowing » The inverse femand function is givan by p= 30-@ Cournet medel. where Q = E,+ * Firm 13 marginal cost is $6lei=6). Fivm 2 uses a nem techaulagy There is no that it's marginal cost is $3 (6=3). fixed cort So The fwo fims chooce thair and Compete only Jame). Answer the follming puestions. O Derive Firm 1 amd Firm 2% vation furtions reupertivaly. o Solve Hhe Harh equilibrium ( ", q") O What is He equilibrinm level for eah firm. quenti tias simultaneculy (So it's a one- shot simultaneaus once price and what is Hhe profit Suppore there is Iim 2. Wlhat is the highert price that Firm I is willing to paj for this new o Mow let's chauge the setup from Coumet campetition to Bertrand Competitin, while maintaining all efther aJAump tins. What is He equilibium price? O Suppon the fwe finms engage in Betrand (ompetition What is the hijhut price that Fim 1 o milling for He new feihnly? * market for the teihue lagy uped by to
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