Note: Plot your points in the order in which you would like them connected. Line segments will connect the points automatically.(?)FREE-THROW PERCENTAGE1009080703020100012GAME35Game Free-Throw PercentageAverage Free-Throw PercentageYou can think of the result in any one game as being Sam's marginal free-throw percentage. Based on your previous answer, you can deduce thatwhen Sam's marginal free-throw percentage is above the average, the average must beYou can now apply this analysis to production costs. For a U-shaped average total cost curve, when the marginal cost curve is below the average totalcost curve, the average total cost must beAlso, when the marginal cost curve is above the average total cost curve, the average totalcost must be. Therefore, the marginal cost curve intersects the average total cost curve Consider the following scenario to understand the relationship between marginal and average values. Suppose Sam is a professional basketball player,and his game log for free throws can be summarized in the following table.Fill in the columns with Sam's free-throw percentage for each game and his overall free-throw average after each game.Game Result Total Game Free-Throw Percentage Average Free-Throw PercentageGame18/108012/2014/2816/3222/4023458/104/102/82/46/880On the following graph, use the orange points (square symbol) to plot Sam's free-throw percentage for each game individually, and use the greenpoints (triangle symbol) to plot his overall average free-throw percentage after each game.Note: Plot your points in the order in which you would like them connected. Line segments will connect the points automatically.

Average total cost is the per unit average cost of production. It is determined by dividing the…

Note: Plot your points in the order in which you would like them connected. Line segments will connect the points automatically. (?) FREE-THROW PERCENTAGE 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0 2 GAME 3 5 -O- Game Free-Throw Percentage Average Free-Throw Percentage You can think of the result in any one game as being Sam's marginal free-throw percentage. Based on your previous answer, you can deduce that when Sam's marginal free-throw percentage is above the average, the average must be You can now apply this analysis to production costs. For a U-shaped average total cost curve, when the marginal cost curve is below the average tota cost curve, the average total cost must be . Also, when the marginal cost curve is above the average total cost curve, the average total ▼. Therefore, the marginal cost curve intersects the average total cost curve cost must be

Note: Plot your points in the order in which you would like them connected. Line segments will connect the points automatically. (?) FREE-THROW PERCENTAGE 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0 2 GAME 3 5 -O- Game Free-Throw Percentage Average Free-Throw Percentage You can think of the result in any one game as being Sam's marginal free-throw percentage. Based on your previous answer, you can deduce that when Sam's marginal free-throw percentage is above the average, the average must be You can now apply this analysis to production costs. For a U-shaped average total cost curve, when the marginal cost curve is below the average tota cost curve, the average total cost must be . Also, when the marginal cost curve is above the average total cost curve, the average total ▼. Therefore, the marginal cost curve intersects the average total cost curve cost must be

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Cameron and Luke are playing a game called ”Race to 10”. Cameron goes first, and the players take turns choosing either 1 or 2. In each turn, they add the new number to a running total. The player who brings the total to exactly 10 wins the game. a) If both Cameron and Luke play optimally, who will win the game? Does the game have a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage? b) Suppose the game is modified to ”Race to 11” (i.e, the player who reaches 11 first wins). Who will win the game if both players play their optimal strategies? What if the game is ”Race to 12”? Does the result change? c) Consider the general version of the game called ”Race to n,” where n is a positive integer greater than 0. What are the conditions on n such that the game has a first mover advantage? What are the conditions on n such that the game has a second mover advantage?
Topic B Problem: Imagine you have two competing athletes who have the option to use an illegal and/or dangerous drug to enhance their performance (i.e., dope). If neither athlete dopes, then neither gains an advantage. If only one dopes, then that athlete gains a massive advantage over their competitor, reduced by the medical and legal risks of doping. However, if both athletes dope, the advantages cancel out, and only the risks remain, putting them both in a worse position than if neither had been doping. What class concept best describes this situation? Using this class concept, what outcome do we expect from these two athletes? Are there any factors that could change the outcome predicted by this course concept?
For this question, my friends are saying the number of strategies are 27. Is there any table that was computed before arriving at that answer? I don't really understand how they came up with that number of strategies.
14 To make the best decisions in a sequential game, you must concentrate on only your objectives and ignore your rival's objectives. A False B. True
E1
4 In a gambling game, Player A and Player B both have a $5 and a $10 bill. Each player selects one of the bills without the other player knowing the bill selected. Simultaneously they both reveal the bills selected. If the bills do not match, Player A wins Player B's bill. If the bills match, Player B wins Player A's bill. (a) Develop the game theory table for this game. The values should be expressed as the gains (or losses) for Player A. Player B Player A $5 $10 $5 (b) Is there a pure strategy? Why or why not? ---Select--- . Since the maximum of the row minimums is --Select--- (c) Determine the optimal strategies and the value of this game. probability Player A selects $5 probability Player A selects $10 probability Player B selects $5 probability Player B selects $10 = = $10 = = Does the game favor one player over the other? Yes O No and the minimum of the column maximums is (d) Suppose Player B decides to deviate from the optimal strategy and begins playing each bill 50% of the…
5. Consider the payoff matrix we saw in the run-pass game: Payoff Matrix for Football Game Run defense Pass Defense Offense Runs - 5 5 Offense Passes 10 If the offense decides to play 60% of the time pass and 40% of the time run, while the defense chooses to defend the pass and the run 50% of the time each, what is the expected yards gained from the offense? a. 3 b. 0 С. 10 d. 5
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10) Consider a repeated game in which the following one-shot game between two players is repeated "infinitely." Denote by "d" the discount factor. (Assume both players have the same discount factor.) Player 2 Cooperate Defect Player 1 Cooperate 5, 4 0, 5 Defect 6, 0 1, 1 The two players try to support cooperation by using "grim trigger strategy" as discussed in class. Answer YES or NO to each of the following three questions. (a) Can they support cooperation if the common discount factor, d, is equal to 0.23? (b) Can they support cooperation if the common discount factor, d, is equal to 0.4? (c) Can they support cooperation if the common discount factor, d, is equal to 0.15?
Question-2 The Lahore Metro Bus is crowded for travel during peak hours. During such travel hours two daily passengers 'Ali' and 'Hassan' enter the Metro. Luckily, two adjacent seats are free in the bus. Each of them must decide whether to sit or stand. For both, sitting alone is more comfortable than sitting next to the other person, which in turn is more comfortable than standing. (Note: for parts (a) & (b) below consider Ali as 'row player' and Hassan as 'column player'). a) Model the situation as a strategic game, assuming both 'Ali' and 'Hassan' care only about their own comfort. Find the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) if it exists. Also, does a dominant strategy exist for either 'Ali' or 'Hassan'? b) Now assume that both 'Ali' and 'Hassan' are altruistic, ranking outcomes according to the other person's comfort and, out of politeness, prefer to stand than to sit if the other person stands. Model the situation as a strategic game and find any Nash equilibrium (equilibria) if it…
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