Storage Wars (Forever)Microsoft (OneDrive) and Box have to select storage amounts for their "free" accounts.As storage is costly, their profits will depend on how much they offer, andwhat their rival is offering. Payoffs are: (Box, OneDrive).OneDrive45 GB30 GB15 GBStrate gy45 GB20,2030, 1036, -430 GB10, 3024, 2432, 415 GB-4,364, 3230, 30This time, the game is played “forever." Box adopts the following triggerstrategy: "Box will start by playing 15GB and play 15GB as long a OneDrive plays 15GB.If OneDrive ever plays 30GB or 45GB, then Box will play 45GB forever after."Assume that the interest rate (i) Is 20%.What is OneDrive's payoff if it chooses a strategy to always:(1) Play 15GB.(2) Play 30GB.(3) Play 45GB.1Show all work.

Microsoft (OneDrive) and Box have to select storage amounts for their "free" accounts. As storage is costly, their profits will depend on how much they offer, and what their rival is offering. Payoffs are: (Box, OneDrive). OneDrive Strate gy 45 GB 30 GB 15 GB 45 GB 30, 10 24, 24 20,20 36, -4 30 GB 10, 30 32, 4 15 GB -4,36 4, 32 30, 30

Microsoft (OneDrive) and Box have to select storage amounts for their "free" accounts. As storage is costly, their profits will depend on how much they offer, and what their rival is offering. Payoffs are: (Box, OneDrive). OneDrive Strate gy 45 GB 30 GB 15 GB 45 GB 30, 10 24, 24 20,20 36, -4 30 GB 10, 30 32, 4 15 GB -4,36 4, 32 30, 30

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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