Storage Wars (Forever)Microsoft (OneDrive) and Box have to select storage amounts for their "free" accounts.As storage is costly, their profits will depend on how much they offer, andwhat their rival is offering. Payoffs are: (Box, OneDrive).OneDrive45 GB30 GB15 GBStrate gy45 GB20,2030, 1036, -430 GB10, 3024, 2432, 415 GB-4,364, 3230, 30This time, the game is played “forever." Box adopts the following triggerstrategy: "Box will start by playing 15GB and play 15GB as long a OneDrive plays 15GB.If OneDrive ever plays 30GB or 45GB, then Box will play 45GB forever after."Assume that the interest rate (i) Is 20%.What is OneDrive's payoff if it chooses a strategy to always:(1) Play 15GB.(2) Play 30GB.(3) Play 45GB.1Show all work.

Microsoft (OneDrive) and Box have to select storage amounts for their "free" accounts. As storage is costly, their profits will depend on how much they offer, and what their rival is offering. Payoffs are: (Box, OneDrive). OneDrive Strate gy 45 GB 30 GB 15 GB 45 GB 30, 10 24, 24 20,20 36, -4 30 GB 10, 30 32, 4 15 GB -4,36 4, 32 30, 30

Microsoft (OneDrive) and Box have to select storage amounts for their "free" accounts. As storage is costly, their profits will depend on how much they offer, and what their rival is offering. Payoffs are: (Box, OneDrive). OneDrive Strate gy 45 GB 30 GB 15 GB 45 GB 30, 10 24, 24 20,20 36, -4 30 GB 10, 30 32, 4 15 GB -4,36 4, 32 30, 30

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Starbucks and Krispy Kreme are trying to decide whether or not to open a shop in the new Mall of Africa. They both prefer if the other firm opens a shop because they can draw bigger crowds but neither wants to be the only American-branded coffee shop in the Mall. The payoff matrix for this dilemma is below. Krispy Kreme Open Don't Open Starbucks Open (i) (ii) 5,5 2,6 Don't open (iii) (iii) 6,2 3,3 MCQ question 4 Find the Nash Equilibrium (Starbucks, Krispy Kreme) for the payoff matrix when the game is played simultaneously. A. (5:5) only. B. (6,2) only. C. (2,6) only. D. (3,3) only E. There is no stable Nash Equilibrium. MCQ question 5 Suppose that Starbucks goes first in choosing to open or not to open. What is the outcome for this game? A. (5:5) only. B. (6,2) only. C. (2,6) only. D. (3,3) only E. There is no stable Nash Equilibrium.
Two rival companies competing in the same market need to decide their plans for future expansion of their stores. The Table below shows the possible outcomes of their mutually interdependent actions (payoffs are profits in £m) Giga Company Titanic Conglomerate No Change Refurbishment of existing stores Large Expansion No Change 30, 40 25, 35 15, 24 Refurbishment of existing stores 35, 30 28, 32 18, 33 Large Expansion 12, 22 18, 20 20, 25 The Nash equilibrium: (A) does not exist. (B) occurs when both firms choose Refurbishment of existing stores. (C) occurs when both firms choose Large Expansion. (D) occurs when both firms choose No Change.
60B- What is the Nash equilibrium for this game and identify the profit each player gets at this solution 5 m
What is the Nash equilibrium?
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Brown’s TV Production is considering producing a pilot for a comedy series for a major network. While the network may reject the pilot and series, it may also purchase the program for 1 or 2 years. Brown may produce the pilot or transfer the rights for the series to a competitor for $100,000. Brown’s profits are summarized in the following payoff table (profits in thousands). sate of nature reject 1 year 2 years produce pilot -100 50 150 sell to competitor 100 100 100 If the probability estimates for the states of nature are, P(reject)=0.20, P(1 year)=0.30, and P(2 years)=0.5, what is the maximum Brown should be willing to pay for inside information on what the network will do?
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Starbucks and Krispy Kreme are trying to decide whether or not to open a shop in the new Mall of Africa. They both prefer if the other firm opens a shop because they can draw bigger crowds but neither wants to be the only American-branded coffee shop in the Mall. The payoff matrix for this dilemma is below. Krispy Kreme Open Don't Open Starbucks Open (i) (ii) 5.5 2,6 Don't open (iii) (iii) 6,2 3.3 MCQ question 4 Find the Nash Equilibrium (Starbucks, Krispy Kreme) for the payoff matrix when the game is played simultaneously. A. (5;5) only. OB. (6,2) only. OC. (2,6) only OD. (3,3) only O E. There is no stable Nash Equilibrium.