5. Duopolist firms 1 and 2 compete on price with some market differentiation. Demand for firm ie{1, 2} is q, = 2 – 2p, + P, Neither firm has costs. a. Find the best response functions for each firm in the static game. b. Find the unique Nash equilibrium prices in the static game. c. Are prices strategic complements or strategic substitutes? Briefly explain. d. Does Firm 1 want Firm 2 to increase or decrease p,?

5. Duopolist firms 1 and 2 compete on price with some market differentiation. Demand for firm ie{1, 2} is q, = 2 – 2p, + P, Neither firm has costs. a. Find the best response functions for each firm in the static game. b. Find the unique Nash equilibrium prices in the static game. c. Are prices strategic complements or strategic substitutes? Briefly explain. d. Does Firm 1 want Firm 2 to increase or decrease p,?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.8P

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2. Using a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcome Please help
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Belge1 - Word eri Gözden Geçir Görünüm Yardım Ne yapmak istediğinizi söyleyin 1) Two firms, X and Y, are planning to market their new products. Each firm can develop TV, Laptop. Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrix ! FIRM Y TV LAPTOP PHONE FIRM X TV 30, 30 60. 35 20, 50 LAPTOP 40,70 20, 20 50,80 PHONE 50,20 80,50 10,10 A) Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both firms make their decisions at the same time. (explain the decision step by step); B) If each firm is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy, what will be the resulting equilibrium? (explain the decision step by step); C) What will be the equilibrium if Firm X makes its selection first? If Firm Y goes first?:
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6.
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