MAC = 94 - 0.04E %3D MD = 0.01E The government sets an emission standard at E = 2000. %3D The probability of getting caught polluting, however, is only 44%. If the polluter pollutes more than 2000 units they will have to pay a fine. The fine would have to be greater than or equal to $ to ensure polluters will comply with the emission standard.

MAC = 94 - 0.04E %3D MD = 0.01E The government sets an emission standard at E = 2000. %3D The probability of getting caught polluting, however, is only 44%. If the polluter pollutes more than 2000 units they will have to pay a fine. The fine would have to be greater than or equal to $ to ensure polluters will comply with the emission standard.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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