let X be a binomial random variable with parameters n and θ1. Conditional on X = m, let Y be a binomial random variable with parameters m and θ2. (a) What is the marginal distribution of Y ? (b) Find the functions g(k) = E(Y |X = k) and v(k) = V ar(Y |X = k). Use these to find E(Y ) and V ar(Y ). (c) Find Covariance(X, Y ) and Correlation(X, Y ).

let X be a binomial random variable with parameters n and θ1. Conditional on X = m, let Y be a binomial random variable with parameters m and θ2. (a) What is the marginal distribution of Y ? (b) Find the functions g(k) = E(Y |X = k) and v(k) = V ar(Y |X = k). Use these to find E(Y ) and V ar(Y ). (c) Find Covariance(X, Y ) and Correlation(X, Y ).

MATLAB: An Introduction with Applications

6th Edition

ISBN:9781119256830

Author:Amos Gilat

Publisher:Amos Gilat

Chapter1: Starting With Matlab

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1P

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