KATE ENTER DON'T ENTER High Price Mary makes Php5,000,000 Kate makes Php2,000,000 MARY COFFEE Mary makes Php7,000,000 Kate has no profit Low Price Mary makes Php1,000,000 Kate loses Php1,000,000 Mary makes Php2,000,000 Kate has no profit A. Who among Kate and Mary have the dominant strategy? What is/are the dominant strategy/ies? B. What is the Nash equilibrium in the problem? How many Nash Equilibrium are there?

KATE ENTER DON'T ENTER High Price Mary makes Php5,000,000 Kate makes Php2,000,000 MARY COFFEE Mary makes Php7,000,000 Kate has no profit Low Price Mary makes Php1,000,000 Kate loses Php1,000,000 Mary makes Php2,000,000 Kate has no profit A. Who among Kate and Mary have the dominant strategy? What is/are the dominant strategy/ies? B. What is the Nash equilibrium in the problem? How many Nash Equilibrium are there?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

not use ai please
14.2. Ignoring mixed strategies, does the following game have a Nash equilibrium? Does it have more than one Nash equilibrium? If so, what are they? Player 2 West East 21 3,2 North 1000, 900 Player1 South 21
4. Suppose in 1977 Honda and Toyota each have to decide whether to build an automobile plant in the North American market. The payoff matrix below shows Honda's payoff on the left, and Toyota's on the right. Is there a Nash equilibrium? If so, where, and how do you know? Тoyota Build small Don't build anything plant Build small 16, 16 20, 15 Honda plant Don't build anything 15, 20 18, 18
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Andrew and Beth are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Andrew chooses Right and Beth chooses Right, Andrew will receive a payoff of 6 and Beth will receive a payoff of 5. Andrew Left Right Left 8,4 5,4 Beth Right 4,5 6,5 The only dominant strategy in this game is for to choose The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Andrew chooses and Beth chooses
Player 2 E F H A 6, 5 6, 7 9, 6 7,6 В Player 1 C 6, 7 6, 9 8, 5 9, 7 5, 8 5, 6 7,5 7,5 7,9 8, 7 11, 6 5, 6 (1) In the Unique Nash equilibrium of this game, which strategy does Player1 play? And why? (2) In the Unique Nash equilibrium of this game, which strategy does Player2 play? And why? (3) Is this game dominance solvable? And Why? (4) Does this game have at least one inadmissible Nash equilibrium? And Why?
1
Player B Strategy 1 2 Player A Strategy 1 $2,400, $1,200 -$1,200, -$2,400 2 -$2,400, -$1,200 $1,200, $2,400 Does Player A have a dominant strategy? Yes or no? Does player B have a dominant startegy? Yes or No?
Sh 20
5. Using the data below determine if there is a Nash equilibrium. If so, what is it? Player B Left Right Player A Up -3 for A 12 for A 20 for B 10 for B 10 for A 10 for B 16 for B Down -2 for A A. A chooses Up, B chooses Right B. A chooses Up, B chooses Left C. A chooses Down, B chooses Right D. There is no Nash Equilibrium
4. In business dealings in a small, isolated town, a given person can either behave like a saint or behave like a crook. Saint Crook Saint 5,5 9,0 Crook 0,9 -2,-2 Given these payoffs, how often does a person play Saint in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium? What are the expected payoffs in such an equilibrium?
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Carlos and Deborah are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Carlos chooses Right and Deborah chooses Right, Carlos will receive a payoff of 5 and Deborah will receive a payoff of 1. Carlos Deborah Left Left 4,4 Right 2,4 Right 6,7 5,1 The only dominant strategy in this game is for to choose The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Carlos chooses and Deborah chooses
Dynamic Game: US Tax No Tax Fiji Fiji Tax No Tax Tax No Tax 10,000,10 9900,-9989 10,100,-89.990 Sub-game_1 10,000,-99,989 Sub-game_2 Sub-game_3 1. Is there a Nash Equilibrium of this game in which Fiji improves its payoffs relative to the Sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium? If there is, explain carefully why this strategy profile is not a Sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium.