Johan and Jeganathan both advertised to sell their used car in the internet and Ah Lim is an interestedbuyer. Johan's car is a "lemon" because the engine is faulty but one cannot tell from the body of the car.Jeganathan's car is a "peach" because he always takes good care of it. Ah Lim is unable to differentiate thequality between the two cars. In economic theory, signaling may help to solve this problem of lack ofinformation. Which party has the most incentive to use signaling in this case?Johan dan Jeganathan sama-sama mengiklankan untuk menjual kereta terpakai mereka dalam internet dan AhLim adalah seorang pembeli yang berminat. Kereta Johan adalah "lemon" kerana enjinnya telah rosak tetapiseseorang tidak dapat mengetahui dari badan kereta itu. Kereta Jeganathan adalah "peach" kerana dia sentiasamenjaganya dengan baik. Ah Lim tidak dapat membezakan kualiti antara kedua-dua kereta itu. Dalam teoriekonomi, "signaling" boleh membantu menyelesaikan masalah kekurangan maklumat ini. Pihak manakah yangmempunyai insentif paling tinggi untuk menggunakan "signaling" dalam kes ini?a. Both Johan and Jeganathan / Kedua-dua Johan dan Jeganathanb. Johan but not Jeganathan / Johan tetapi bukan Jeganathanc. Ah Limd. Jeganathan but not Johan / Jeganathan tetapi bukan Johan If Ali is willing to pay RM100,000 for a used BMW that is a "peach" and RM30,000 for a used BMW that is a"lemon", then Ali will offerJika Ali sanggup membayar RM100,000 untuk sebuah BMW terpakai yang merupakan "peach" dan RM30,000untuk BMW terpakai yang merupakan "lemon", maka Ali akan menawarkan.a. RM65,000 for any used BMW if the probability that it is a "lemon" is 50%RM65,000 untuk mana-mana BMW terpakai jika kebarangkalian ianya adalah "lemon" ialah 50%b. RM130,000 for any used BMW if the probability that it is a "peach" is 50%RM130,000 untuk mana-mana BMW terpakai jika kebarangkalian ianya adalah "peach" ialah 50%c. RM30,000 for any used BMW even if the probability that it is a "lemon" is 50%RM30,000 untuk mana-mana BMW terpakai walaupun kebarangkalian ianya adalah "lemon" ialah 50%d. RM100,000 for any used BMW even if the probability that it is a "peach" is 50%

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Johan and Jeganathan both advertised to sell their used car in the internet and Ah Lim is an interested buyer. Johan's car is a "lemon" because the engine is faulty but one cannot tell from the body of the car. Jeganathan's car is a "peach" because he always takes good care of it. Ah Lim is unable to differentiate the quality between the two cars. In economic theory, signaling may help to solve this problem of lack of information. Which party has the most incentive to use signaling in this case?

Johan and Jeganathan both advertised to sell their used car in the internet and Ah Lim is an interested buyer. Johan's car is a "lemon" because the engine is faulty but one cannot tell from the body of the car. Jeganathan's car is a "peach" because he always takes good care of it. Ah Lim is unable to differentiate the quality between the two cars. In economic theory, signaling may help to solve this problem of lack of information. Which party has the most incentive to use signaling in this case?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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