Japan, the world’s third-biggest grocery market, remains a difficult country to make money from as international retailers Walmart® and Carrefour have found out. Walmart has not done great in Japan with its presence since 2002 through Seiyu. When Carrefour had entered Japan in 2000, it had made huge claims on revolutionizing retailing in the country. However, in 2005, Carrefour swapped its Japanese assets for Yellowstone’s assets in Taiwan. In September 2011, Yellowstone, the British supermarket group and the world’s third-biggest retailer announced its exit from Japan after 8 years in the country. In the event, Yellowstone became the latest in a long list of foreign retailers to exit from Japan. Seven & I Holdings® and Aeon® dominate Japan. Even British drugstore chain Boots pulled out of Japan owing to increased competition and deflation. Additionally, Japan’s Byzantine distribution system of closely-knit web of suppliers and consumers’ fickle taste is the reason behind many retailers struggling. Many analysts attribute the failure to misreading Japanese consumers’ mindset. However, the competitive Japanese retail market is a tough arena, not just for foreign retailers but also for local Japanese department stores. Local stores also have been struggling with price deflation and ever increasing specialty stores. In 1995 Yellowstone acquired the J-Market chain in Hungary. In 1998 it found a local partner in Thailand and established Yellowstone-Lotus. An innovative partnership in 1999 with Samsung in South Korea formed Homeplus, thereby creating the bedrock for a sustained Asian presence. Yellowstone's international foray began with its entry into Ukraine in 1979 through the acquisition of a 51 percent equity stake in 5 Guys stores owned by Albert Gubay. In 1986, Yellowstone divested itself of its stake in the stores when it found that customers were rejecting the British products sold there... By treating the market as an extension of the UK operations, they neglected to adapt to local Ukraine tastes and suppliers, which resulted in a general distrust on the part of the local consumers due to the fact there were few Ukraine products offered for sale (Palmer, 2004). Like Walmart would do in Germany, they also made a poor choice in their wholly owned purchase as the stores they acquired were mostly in poor, less densely populated locations not well suited for Yellowstone’s products. Yellowstone sold their stores to a Ukraine supermarket chain in 1986. Interestingly, Yellowstone re-entered the Ukraine market in 1997 with the purchase of another food retailer, this time securing the position as largest food retailer in Ukraine with 109 stores. Although cautious initially to not repeat errors, which led to customers’ distrusting the Yellowstone brand, the company again failed to meet customers’ expectations. Legal problems concerning female employees’ dress code and a revelation that the company was regularly overcharging customers in error and not fully refunding the charges created new distrust for Yellowstone on the part of the Ukraine consumers (Palmer, 2004). Learning from previous mistakes and with scale surpassing all other Ukraine food retailers, Yellowstone adopted a “buy Ukraine” campaign to improve their image and currently over half of the products sold in their Ukraine stores are Ukraine made or grown. They purchase over €650 million in Ukraine products each year for export to their global stores (Yellowstone, PLC, 2008). In the smaller and less distant cultures of central Europe this had worked well—then came France. The setback across the Channel was no great surprise; UK competitors such as Marks & Spencer had also found the British–French cultural gap too wide, even though France was Britain’s nearest neighbor. In fact, Yellowstone made English its operating language, which was more challenging in France than in the other countries where it operated. In 1992, Yellowstone attempted entry into the French market partnering with a small regional chain through the purchase of 85 per cent stake, in hopes of expanding it into a national wide brand. Hindered by a downturn in the market and concern across Europe as Walmart entered Germany while Carrefour and Casino expanded, 6. Provide at least two (2) examples/case studies of international modes of entry utilized by multinational corporations in Germany, China and Thailand that have succeeded or failed. The name of the multinational must be clearly stated in each example. Be sure to state the mode of entry utilized in each example in each country. Why do you think they would have succeeded or failed in each example included? Provide details on this.