Instead of choosing Game A or Game B in the first stage, player 1 chooses either game B or directly which action to play in game A. Game L U (10,5) D (5,10) R (0,0) (0,0) Game B: L R U (6,6) (0,0) D (0,0) (0,0) (a) Write the game in extensive form. (b) Solve for all SPNES of the modified game. (c) Do all the SPNEs give intuitively reasonable predictions? Why or why not? (Hint: think about what the modification of the payoff to game A entail for player 2 in that game and how the predictions contrast with the case where the game is chosen first, then the action.)

Instead of choosing Game A or Game B in the first stage, player 1 chooses either game B or directly which action to play in game A. Game L U (10,5) D (5,10) R (0,0) (0,0) Game B: L R U (6,6) (0,0) D (0,0) (0,0) (a) Write the game in extensive form. (b) Solve for all SPNES of the modified game. (c) Do all the SPNEs give intuitively reasonable predictions? Why or why not? (Hint: think about what the modification of the payoff to game A entail for player 2 in that game and how the predictions contrast with the case where the game is chosen first, then the action.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Question

5. Instead of choosing Game A or Game B in the first stage, player 1 chooses either game B or directly which action to
play in game A.
Game
U
D
L
(10,5)
(5,10)
R
(0,0)
(0,0)
:Game B:
L
R
U
(6,6)
(0,0)
D (0,0) (0,0)
(a) Write the game in extensive form.
(b) Solve for all SPNEs of the modified game.
(c) Do all the SPNEs give intuitively reasonable predictions? Why or why not? (Hint: think about what the
modification of the payoff to game A entail for player 2 in that game and how the predictions contrast with the
case where the game is chosen first, then the action.)

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Chegg Home Expert Q&A My solutions Question 18 3 pts Consider the non-repeating game depicted in the following payoff matrix Player One \table[[Player Two,,,otion B], [Option C, 30, 100, 0, 500], [Option D, 40, 300,, 200]] Which outcome is the Maximax equilibrium? 80,200 50, 500 30, 100 40, 300 C Question 18 Consider the non-repeating game depicted in the following payoff matrix Player One Option A Option B Player Two Option C 30, 100 50, 500 Option D 40, 300 80, 200 Which outcome is the Maximax equilibrium? O 80, 200 O 50, 500 O 30,100 O 40, 300 3 pts 8 ▾
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