Instead of choosing Game A or Game B in the first stage, player 1 chooses either game B or directly which action to play in game A. Game L U (10,5) D (5,10) R (0,0) (0,0) Game B: L R U (6,6) (0,0) D (0,0) (0,0) (a) Write the game in extensive form. (b) Solve for all SPNES of the modified game. (c) Do all the SPNEs give intuitively reasonable predictions? Why or why not? (Hint: think about what the modification of the payoff to game A entail for player 2 in that game and how the predictions contrast with the case where the game is chosen first, then the action.)

Instead of choosing Game A or Game B in the first stage, player 1 chooses either game B or directly which action to play in game A. Game L U (10,5) D (5,10) R (0,0) (0,0) Game B: L R U (6,6) (0,0) D (0,0) (0,0) (a) Write the game in extensive form. (b) Solve for all SPNES of the modified game. (c) Do all the SPNEs give intuitively reasonable predictions? Why or why not? (Hint: think about what the modification of the payoff to game A entail for player 2 in that game and how the predictions contrast with the case where the game is chosen first, then the action.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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1. Consider a sequential continuum game with two players, in which Player 1 first chooses a continuous variable £₁, and then Player 2 selects £2, with payoff functions ₁ and 7₂. Find the best response for P2, as the function î2 = BR₂(x1), for each given #₂: (a) (b) (c) T₂(x1, x₂) ) = (1400 — x1 — x2)x2 − 13x² T₂(x1, x₂) T₂(X1, X2₂) = : 100x2 + 3x1x2 − 14x1 – 30x1x² = 15x2 x² + x² +1
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P2: Hawk Dove P1: Hawk -25, -25 50, 0 Dove 0, 50 15, 15 Is the mixed-strategy NE of the above game an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)? Show your work and explain your answer.
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Chegg Home Expert Q&A My solutions Question 18 3 pts Consider the non-repeating game depicted in the following payoff matrix Player One \table[[Player Two,,,otion B], [Option C, 30, 100, 0, 500], [Option D, 40, 300,, 200]] Which outcome is the Maximax equilibrium? 80,200 50, 500 30, 100 40, 300 C Question 18 Consider the non-repeating game depicted in the following payoff matrix Player One Option A Option B Player Two Option C 30, 100 50, 500 Option D 40, 300 80, 200 Which outcome is the Maximax equilibrium? O 80, 200 O 50, 500 O 30,100 O 40, 300 3 pts 8 ▾
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(c) Consider the following two-player, zero-sum game: Y1 Y2 X1 -2 8 X2 10 -5 What is the outcome of this game?
Problem 3 Consider the following simultaneous normal form game: P.2 R 0,0 -1, 1 1, -1 P.1 P 1, -1 0,0 -1, 1 S -1, 1 1, -1 0,0 Now assume the game is not simultaneous and player 1 gets to play first. Create a game tree that represents the sequential game. Also, name each node, define the set of information sets for each player, show which nodes are in which information set and add define action sets at each info set.
1. Draw tree of the game clearly, handwritten is preferable.