Ans both.. otherwise dont ans In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 (2007), the Supreme Courtruled thatO public school policies that assigned students to a school on the basis of race were constitutional.O state-imposed desegregation could only be brought about by busing children across school districts.O public school policies that assigned students to a school on the basis of race were unconstitutional becausethey discriminated against African Americans.O public school policies that assigned students to a school on the basis of race were unconstitutional becausethey discriminated against whites. One initial problem with policing workplace discrimination through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964 was thatO the complaining party was required to show evidence that deliberate discrimination was the cause of a failureto get a job or a training opportunity.both the federal and state government civil rights agencies were required to reach the same conclusion abouta complaint before any penalty could be assessed to a discriminatory employer.O it covered only state government agencies and did not apply to private employers.there were no federal government agencies or departments authorized to investigate complaints or enforcethe law.

The Seattle School District permitted understudies to apply to any secondary school. Since the…

Answered: In Parents Involved in Community…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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For this question, my friends are saying the number of strategies are 27. Is there any table that was computed before arriving at that answer? I don't really understand how they came up with that number of strategies.
3 0: she makes a pront of $9 An is ISK AVCise and aunty she makes. Let P be the probability that it rains the day of the concert. Find the number P tha makes Ann indifferent between organizing the concert in the Club or at the Park. 8. Compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game below: Bungle F2 # Zippy E Left Right DOD F4 Up 2,-1 R I 20 F3 $ BAG 3 4 -2,0 HOT % 5 F5 Down 3,1 T 4,-2 VO MacBook Air 6 F6 Y & 7 F7 * U 8
4 In a gambling game, Player A and Player B both have a $5 and a $10 bill. Each player selects one of the bills without the other player knowing the bill selected. Simultaneously they both reveal the bills selected. If the bills do not match, Player A wins Player B's bill. If the bills match, Player B wins Player A's bill. (a) Develop the game theory table for this game. The values should be expressed as the gains (or losses) for Player A. Player B Player A $5 $10 $5 (b) Is there a pure strategy? Why or why not? ---Select--- . Since the maximum of the row minimums is --Select--- (c) Determine the optimal strategies and the value of this game. probability Player A selects $5 probability Player A selects $10 probability Player B selects $5 probability Player B selects $10 = = $10 = = Does the game favor one player over the other? Yes O No and the minimum of the column maximums is (d) Suppose Player B decides to deviate from the optimal strategy and begins playing each bill 50% of the…
Problem 2. (SPNE 2). Consider the following extensive form game between two players. (1,10) .. D 2 1 B X Y (a) List all pure strategies of player 2. (b) Represent this game in normal form. (c) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. (d) Find all SPNE (in pure strategies) of this game. (6,3) (4,2) (5,1)
Do not use Ai and chatgpt.
Jack and Diane work at a bakery. Jack can make either five batches of cookies or two cakes per hour, while Diane can make either four batches of cookies or three cakes per hour. At 9:00 a.m. they receive an order for 24 batches of cookies and nine cakes. What time is the soonest they can have the order ready?
4. Consider the situation in which player 1 knows what game is played (the first or the second). But player 2 only knows that the first game is played with probability 1/3 and the second game is played with probability 2/3. Player 1 Player 1 Player 2 S B S 1,1 0,0 B 0,0 0,0 Player 2 S B S 0,0 0,0 B 0,0 2,2 (a) Describe the game as a Bayesian game. (b) Find the Bayesian Nash equilibria.
How can I solve questions 3 and 4?
Karen goes to the casino with 1000$ and plays the following strategy: In her first game, she putsin 1$. If she wins, she finishes playing and takes her profit home. If she looses a game, she willplay another game and put in twice as much money as she did in the previous game. If she wins,she will finish playing and take her profits home. She will keep going with that strategy, untilshe either wins a game or runs out of money.(a) Create a table for n = 1, 2, ..., 10 which lists: (a) The amount of money she puts in in game n;(b) the sum of the amount of money she has put in in all games up to this game n; and (c)her overall profit if the game n is the first game she wins.(b) What is the likelihood of her loosing 8 games in a row?(c) How many games can she loose in a row before she cannot afford to continue with herstrategy of doubling her bet?(d) Given the low likelihood of loosing, is this a smart strategy for Karen to pursue?
A5
What is Ann's maximin strategy? Game Bob L RAnn U 10,-1 4, 4 D 4, 1 8, -1 Select one: a.none of the other answers b.4/7 U + 3/7 D c.2/5 U+ 3/5 D d.2/7 U + 5/7 D e.3/5 U + 2/5 D
. If you examine the decision tree in Figure 9.12 (orany other decision trees from PrecisionTree), you willsee two numbers (in blue font) to the right of each endnode. The bottom number is the combined monetaryvalue from following the corresponding path throughthe tree. The top number is the probability that thispath will be followed, given that the best strategy isused. With this in mind, explain (1) how the positiveprobabilities following the end nodes are calculated,(2) why some of the probabilities following the endnodes are 0, and (3) why the sum of the probabilitiesfollowing the end nodes is necessarily 1.

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In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sehöol ruled that O public school policies that assigned students to a school on the basis of race were constitutional.