iii)Consider the following gameSafaricomAirtelHigh priceMedium priceLow priceHigh priceMedium priceLow pricea) Determine the Nash equilibrium ( - --1,10,02,-14,31,20,41,00,13,2b) Represent the game sequentially and determine the sub-game perfect equilibriumassuming Safaricom is the first mover

Nash equilibrium is such an outcome in which neither of the players has any incentive to change…

iii) Consider the following game Safaricom Airtel High price Medium price Low price High price Medium price 1,1 0,0 2,-1 4,3 1,2 0,4 Low price a) Determine the Nash equilibrium 1,0 0,1 3,2 b) Represent the game sequentially and determine the sub-game perfect equilibrium assuming Safaricom is the first mover

iii) Consider the following game Safaricom Airtel High price Medium price Low price High price Medium price 1,1 0,0 2,-1 4,3 1,2 0,4 Low price a) Determine the Nash equilibrium 1,0 0,1 3,2 b) Represent the game sequentially and determine the sub-game perfect equilibrium assuming Safaricom is the first mover

Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305585126

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5CQQ

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Consider the following price game: Firm 1 Firm 2 High Low High 20, 20 12, 24 Low 24, 12 14, 14 Remark: In simultaneous move games (games with rows and columns) theconvention is to write the row player’s payoff first and the column player’spayoff second. (a) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? Recall that for each playeryou should find the best response to each of the opponents’ strategies andunderline the associated payoff. Then look for a cell where both strategiesare best responses to each other. This is a Nash equilibrium. (b) Does either firm have a dominate strategy (a strategy that is always abest response)?
1. For the following game Player B Player A Left 7,17 10,5 4,4 Middle Right 14,11 4,3 10,25 21,21 Тop Middle 14,4 Bottom 7,3 a) Determine the Nash equilibrium is any? b) Represent the game sequentially starting with player 1 and determine the sub-game perfect equilibrium c) Represent the game sequentially starting with player 2 and determine the sub-game perfect equilibrium d) Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the following game e) Firm 1 Firm 2 High price Low price High price 4,3 2,4 Low price 2,4 3,3
6) The following is a static game D 2,2 0,3 D 3,0 1,1 a) Convert this game into dynamic form game b) Find the Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. c) If you consider this game as dynamic then what kind of dynamic game is this.
Pls solve it quickly
NASH EQUILIBRIUM Consider the following game in strategic form. bị b2 a1 10,2 4,20 a2 6,28 9,14 аз 8,6 12,4 1-T-0 1-T The Equilibrium Existence Theorem guarantees that this game possesses at least one Nash equilibrium of the form (T*, o*,T*). Which values of a* are part of such an equilibrium? (Mark all values for which an associated equilibrium exists.) Select one or more: O 0.00 O 0.60 O 0.30 O 1.00 O 0.75 O 0.10 O 0.80 O 0.25
Solve for the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) in each of the following games. (a) The following two-by-two game is a little harder to solve since firm 2’spreferred strategy depends of what firm 1 does. But firm 1 has a dominantstrategy so this game has one Nash equilibrium. Firm 2 Launch Don’tFirm 1 Launch 60, -10 100, 0 Don’t 80, 30 120, 0 What is the Nash equilibrium of this simultaneous-move game? (b) What would the outcome of this game be if instead firm 1 moved first and then, after seeing what firm 1 chose, firm 2 chose it strategy? In this case firm 1 doesn’t necessarily need to choose a best response, but firm 2 must choose a best response since it moves second.
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Consider the following sequential game: 1 O D,L U.L U,R U D,R D (0,2) 2 L What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game? R. (-1,-1) (1,1)
Consider the payoff matrix of a two player game below what are the strategies in the Nash equilibrium
am. 116.
A B 2 2 C 3,2 D 2,1 E 1,1 F In this game, the strategy profile (B.CE) is 4 2.2 not a Nash equilibrium a subgame imperfect Nash equilibrium a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium