If we are two friends and play a game i have two selections with equal probabilities like the other person. Let our game R is: R= 13 32 a) We play several times how can i win what is my stragtegy. b) If we play sequentially and i see your moves first can i win all the time. s can If players can change their past moves can we win if two correction moves worsens one of prior moves

If we are two friends and play a game i have two selections with equal probabilities like the other person. Let our game R is: R= 13 32 a) We play several times how can i win what is my stragtegy. b) If we play sequentially and i see your moves first can i win all the time. s can If players can change their past moves can we win if two correction moves worsens one of prior moves

Database System Concepts

7th Edition

ISBN:9780078022159

Author:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Publisher:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Chapter1: Introduction

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1PE

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Consider the following sequential game. There are two players, Player 1 and Player 2, who alternate turns, Each turn, each player can choose one of two actions: Across (A) or Down (D). If either player chooses D on their turn, the game ends. Otherwise, it becomes the other player's turn, who may again play either A or D. The game ends after 100 turns for each player, if no player has played D previously. Payoffs in the game are represented by the following game tree, where nodes denote turns for each player, branches denote actions, and final payoffs are indicated at the end of each branch (Player 1's payoff is the first number, Player 2's payoff is the second): 100 100 ID D. D 98 98 97 100 99 99 98 101 Note that the sum of payoffs for each player is increasing by 1 each turn. However, a player claims a slightly larger payoff if the game ends on their turn, rather than their opponent's. Assuming that both players strictly apply the principle of backward induction, what payoffs will the…
17 There is a single pile of n chips. Two players take turns by removing from the pile at least one and at most m chips; the number of chips taken may vary from one move to another, but both the lower and upper limits stay the same. The winner is the last player who takes the last chip. Which algorithm design strategy is used in this game? Decrease-by-a-constant algorithm Divide-and-Conquer Variable-size-decrease algorithm Decrease-by-a-constant factor algorithm
Correct answer will be upvoted else Multiple Downvoted. Computer science. Players alternate, Alice moves first. Each turn a player picks any component and eliminates it from the exhibit. In the event that Alice picks even worth, she adds it to her score. On the off chance that the picked esteem is odd, Alice's score doesn't change. Essentially, on the off chance that Bob picks odd worth, he adds it to his score. On the off chance that the picked esteem is even, Bob's score doesn't change. On the off chance that there are no numbers left in the cluster, the game finishes. The player with the most noteworthy score wins. Assuming the scores of the players are equivalent, a draw is announced. For instance, assuming n=4 and a=[5,2,7,3], the game could go as follows (there are different choices): On the principal move, Alice picks 2 and get two focuses. Her score is presently 2. The exhibit an is presently [5,7,3]. On the subsequent move, Bob picks 5 and get five…
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Let n be a natural number. Let's take the following 2 player game. We have .n matches. Player 1 takes one or two matches from the pile, then as long as there are still matches, player 2 takes one or two matches, and so on, alternating until there are no more matches left. The player who takes the last match loses. The losing player gets a benefit of -1 and the other player gets a benefit of 1. Represent this game for n=2 ,n=3 and n=4 and say how many strategies each player has.
Each Othello piece has a black side and a white side. Here is how Othello is played.A piece is considered to be caught when it is encircled by its rivals on both the left and right sides, or both the top and bottom, and when its colour is reversed. You must capture at least one throughout your turn. any of your adversary's pieces. When neither player has any further move options, the game is over. The player who has the most pieces is declared the winner. Put Othello's object-oriented design into practice.
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