Two staff managers in the ΠBΦ sorority, the house manager (player 1) and kitchen manager (player 2), must select a resident assistant from a poolof three candidates: {a, b, c}. Player 1 prefers a to b, and b to c. Player 2 prefers b to a, and a toc. The process that is imposed on them is as follows: First, the house manager vetoes one of thecandidates and announces the veto to the central office for staff selection and to the kitchenmanager. Next the kitchen manager vetoes one of the remaining two candidates and announcesit to the central office. Finally the director of the central office assigns the remaining candidateto be a resident assistant at ΠBΦ.a. Model this as an extensive-form game (using a game tree). You will need to define theutilities of both players.b. Find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) for this game. Is it unique?c. Now assume that before the two players play the game, player 2 can send an alienatinge-mail to one of the candidates, which would result in that candidate withdrawing herapplication. Would player 2 choose to do this, and if so, with which candidate?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
icon
Related questions
Question

Two staff managers in the ΠBΦ sorority, the house manager (player 1) and kitchen manager (player 2), must select a resident assistant from a pool
of three candidates: {a, b, c}. Player 1 prefers a to b, and b to c. Player 2 prefers b to a, and a to
c. The process that is imposed on them is as follows: First, the house manager vetoes one of the
candidates and announces the veto to the central office for staff selection and to the kitchen
manager. Next the kitchen manager vetoes one of the remaining two candidates and announces
it to the central office. Finally the director of the central office assigns the remaining candidate
to be a resident assistant at ΠBΦ.
a. Model this as an extensive-form game (using a game tree). You will need to define the
utilities of both players.
b. Find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) for this game. Is it unique?
c. Now assume that before the two players play the game, player 2 can send an alienating
e-mail to one of the candidates, which would result in that candidate withdrawing her
application. Would player 2 choose to do this, and if so, with which candidate?

Expert Solution
trending now

Trending now

This is a popular solution!

steps

Step by step

Solved in 4 steps with 1 images

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Bayesian Probability Rule
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:
9780190931919
Author:
NEWNAN
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education