EXERCISE 75.1 (Electoral competition between candidates who care only about the winning position) Consider the variant of Hotelling's model in which the can- didates (like the citizens) care about the winner's position, and not at all about winning per se. There are two candidates. Each candidate has a favorite posi- tion; her dislike for other positions increases with their distance from her favorite position. Assume that the favorite position of one candidate is less than m and the favorite position of the other candidate is greater than m. Assume also that if the candidates tie when they take the positions x₁ and x2, then the outcome is the compromise policy (x₁+x2). Find the set of Nash equilibria of the strategic

EXERCISE 75.1 (Electoral competition between candidates who care only about the winning position) Consider the variant of Hotelling's model in which the can- didates (like the citizens) care about the winner's position, and not at all about winning per se. There are two candidates. Each candidate has a favorite posi- tion; her dislike for other positions increases with their distance from her favorite position. Assume that the favorite position of one candidate is less than m and the favorite position of the other candidate is greater than m. Assume also that if the candidates tie when they take the positions x₁ and x2, then the outcome is the compromise policy (x₁+x2). Find the set of Nash equilibria of the strategic

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)

7th Edition

ISBN:9781285165875

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7PA

See similar textbooks

Related questions

Q: Hi, can you explain the formula for get those results.

A: The formulas used to get the values of x1, x2....x9 depends on the values available and deduced in…

Q: 206BF95EF4210223153858 1 /2 Multiple-ChoIce Questions 1. To an economist, the cost of going to a…

A: An economist considers not only the direct or explicit cost of any activity but also the implicit or…

Q: Define econometric in 200 words!

A: Econometrics refers to the use of statistical techniques to economic data in order to provide…

Q: Can you give an example of cost-savings?

A: Answer: Cost reduction is a continuous process of implementing various ways to bring a reduction in…

Q: 2. The marginal opportunity cost of the second unit of pizza is:

A: Opportunity cost is the benefit that is lost when a different option is chosen. You must balance the…

Q: This is wrong question and solution.

A: Apples on sale Bananas on sale Profit from apples $0.25…

Q: Question 35 What have you learned about Microeconomics that you did not know before taking this…

A: Microeconomics is a branch of economics. It deals with the study of individual decisions and…

Q: can you please explain step 4 again, I can't see whats written there.

A: Comparing Insurance Contracts A and B:a. Insurance Contract A (q = $400, r = $220):Actuarially Fair…

Q: What are the logical fallacies and manipulative language used by the author, Zeynep Tufekci in "Why…

A: The article, titled "Why Smart Objects may be a Dumb Idea," expresses concerns about the security…

Q: What is a resource? the result of choices made by business firms the result of scarcity…

A: In the context of economies, scarcity refers to the constrained supply of economic resources.…

Question

PLEASE CHECK THIS HOW TO SOLVE PLEASE TEACH EXPLAIN STEP BY STEP

EXERCISE 75.1 (Electoral competition between candidates who care only about the
winning position) Consider the variant of Hotelling's model in which the can-
didates (like the citizens) care about the winner's position, and not at all about
winning per se. There are two candidates. Each candidate has a favorite posi-
tion; her dislike for other positions increases with their distance from her favorite
position. Assume that the favorite position of one candidate is less than m and
the favorite position of the other candidate is greater than m. Assume also that
if the candidates tie when they take the positions x₁ and x2, then the outcome is
the compromise policy (x1+x2). Find the set of Nash equilibria of the strategic
game that models this situation. (First consider pairs (x₁, x2) of positions for which
either x₁ < m and x₂ < m, or x₁ > m and x2 > m. Next consider pairs (x1, x2)
for which either x₁ <m < x2, or x2 < m < x₁, then those for which x₁ = m and
x2 m, or x₁ m and x2: = m. Finally consider the pair (m, m).)
The set of candidates in Hotelling's model is given. The next exercise asks
you to analyze a model in which the set of candidates is generated as part of an
equilibrium.

Expert Solution

This question has been solved!

Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.

This is a popular solution!

SEE SOLUTION Check out a sample Q&A here

Step 1

VIEW

Step 2

VIEW

Step 3

VIEW

Trending now

This is a popular solution!

Step by step

Solved in 3 steps

SEE SOLUTION Check out a sample Q&A here

Knowledge Booster

Learn more about

Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.

Similar questions

All societies must take decisions on collective resources should be allo- cated. In democratic societies such decisions are often taken by majority voting, as a matter of fact democracy is often associated with majority voting. However, it has for a long time been known that this way of taking collective decisions is associated with certain problems. (a) Assume that a small city should decide whether they should build a new public library (x), a new public swimming pool (y), or improving the street lightning along the city's main street (z). Only one of these alternative can be started during the next budget year. The city population can be divided into three equally large groups, the members of each group has the following preference ordering for these alternatives: 1:x > y > z, 2: y > z> x, 3:z > x> y.
2. Individual Problems 15-2 Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes "cancel each other out." They each gain 20 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 20 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 10 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mr. Ward Vote Vote Mr. Ward: -10, Mrs. Ward: -10 Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -20, Mrs. Ward: 10 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to payoff of O True Mrs. Ward O False Don't Vote Mr. Ward: 10, Mrs. Ward: -20 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. This agreement not to vote True or False: This agreement would increase utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question. and for Mrs. Ward to units of utility. a Nash…
For the simple game depicted below, choose the corresponding voting rule that it represents: 100 BLOCKING WINNING 50 LOSING BLOCKING 250 500 Lower House A bill requires a 3/4 majority in both houses. O The Constitution can be amended with 3/4 of the LH votes and 1/2 of the Senate votes O A bill requires a majority in the LH and a majority in the Senate. O The Constitution can be amended with 3/4 of the Senate and 1/2 of the LH votes. Senate
Need a qualified experts answer will dislike if incorrect answer
Does traditional one-person-one-vote (1p1v) majority voting allow voters to directly express differences in strengths of preference? Does quadratic voting do any better? Discuss the differences and then explain which system you prefer, and why.
There is an election with three candidates: Lady Left (LL). Care Central (CC), and Robert Right (RR). The following are the outcomes in various two- and three-way races: CC. 100%. RR, 0% /LL, 0%. CC/ 100% RR, 51%, LL, 49% RR, 35%. LU 33% CC 329 The voting system is such that first there is a three way race. Then, if none of the three candidates wins more than 50% of the votes, there is a two-way runoff election between the two can Is this voting system consistent? Explain which property of consistency is violated, if any. Short answer
I will give dislike if any mistake found so give answer accuracy .
There are two candidates in an election that compete only on the education budget they will enact if elected. The budget can be any integer from $1 to $8 and the distribution of voters’ preferences over these outcomes is given below. For example, there are 2 voters that prefer a budget of $1, 4 voters that prefer a budget of $2, and so on. Furthermore, all voters have single-peaked preferences. Assume the candidates’ sole objective is to receive as many votes as possible. (Image Attached) a) Find a proposed budget for each candidate that constitutes an equilibrium. Explain.
- = 1.8. Consider a population of voters uniformly distributed along the ideological spectrum from left (x = 0) to right (x = 1). Each of the candidates for a single office simultaneously chooses a cam- paign platform (i.e., a point on the line between x 0 and x 1). The voters observe the candidates' choices, and then each voter votes for the candidate whose platform is closest to the voter's position on the spectrum. If there are two candidates and they choose platforms x₁ = .3 and x2 = .6, for example, then all voters to the left of x .45 vote for candidate 1, all those to the right vote for candidate 2, and candidate 2 wins the elec- tion with 55 percent of the vote. Suppose that the candidates care only about being elected—they do not really care about their platforms at all! If there are two candidates, what is the pure- strategy Nash equilibrium? If there are three candidates, exhibit a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. (Assume that any candidates who choose the same platform…
Don't use chat gpt okkk. Solve handwriting solutions other wise I will dislike okk
Warning ⚠️ I will give dislike if any small mistake found. So better solve otherwise dislike
The city council is to decide on a proposal to raise property taxes. Suppose Ms. Tuttle is the chair and the council’s other two members are Mr. Jones and Mrs. Doubtfire. The voting procedure works as follows: Excluding the chair, Mr. Jones and Mrs. Doubtfire simultaneously write down their votes on slips of paper. Each writes either for or against the tax increase. The secretary of the city council then opens the slips of paper and announces the vote tally. If the secretary reports that both slips say for, then the tax increase is implemented and the game is over. If both vote against, then the tax increase is not implemented and, again, the game is over. However, if it is reported that the vote is one for and one against, then Ms. Tuttle has to vote. If she votes for, then the tax increase is implemented, and if she votes against, then it is not. In both cases, the game is then over. As to payoffs, if the tax increase is implemented, then Mrs. Doubtfire and Mr. Jones each receive a…