Exercise 5: Insurance Consider two individuals, Dave and Eva. Both Dave and Eva have initial wealth 810, 000 and face a 40% chance of losing L = 450, 000. Dave has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function up(x) = x and Eva has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function uE (x) = VT. 1. What do you know about Dave's and Eva's risk preferences? 2. What is the most Dave would be willing to pay for complete insurance against the loss? 3. What is the most Eva would be willing to pay for complete insurance against the loss?

Exercise 5: Insurance Consider two individuals, Dave and Eva. Both Dave and Eva have initial wealth 810, 000 and face a 40% chance of losing L = 450, 000. Dave has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function up(x) = x and Eva has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function uE (x) = VT. 1. What do you know about Dave's and Eva's risk preferences? 2. What is the most Dave would be willing to pay for complete insurance against the loss? 3. What is the most Eva would be willing to pay for complete insurance against the loss?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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