ese two residents. Each of the two residents nas a utility function over private goods t and total Imber of men M, Of the forI: x, M) = 2 In x + In M. The total provision of firemen hired, M, is the sum of the number hired by each of the two persons: ( = M4 + MB. Ann and Bob both have income of 200 each, and the price of both the private good and a fireman is 1. They are limit oviding between 0 and 200 firemen. For the purposes of this problem, you can treat the number of firemen as a continuous variable manvears)

ese two residents. Each of the two residents nas a utility function over private goods t and total Imber of men M, Of the forI: x, M) = 2 In x + In M. The total provision of firemen hired, M, is the sum of the number hired by each of the two persons: ( = M4 + MB. Ann and Bob both have income of 200 each, and the price of both the private good and a fireman is 1. They are limit oviding between 0 and 200 firemen. For the purposes of this problem, you can treat the number of firemen as a continuous variable manvears)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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