Draw a utility function over income u( I) that describes a man who is a risk lover when his income is low but risk averse when his income is high. Can you explain why such a utility function might reasonably describe a person’s preferences?

Draw a utility function over income u( I) that describes a man who is a risk lover when his income is low but risk averse when his income is high. Can you explain why such a utility function might reasonably describe a person’s preferences?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.2P

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