Consider a second price auction with 2 bidders. Each bidder has valuation which is his private information. Valuations are independent and identically distributed uniformly over the interval [0, y] where y> 0. Suppose bidders use the same strictly increasing bidding function Determine the expected revenue collected from bidder 1. 36 30 70 3 O y ○ y ³ O 1 3y ○ y²
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- A cool kid is willing to rename himself for a profit. He decides to auctionoff the naming right. Two bidders show interest. Their valuations for thenaming right are independently and uniformly distributed over [0,100].There are several possible ideas to design the auction. a) The auction runs as follows. Both bidders are invited to the sameroom; an auctioneer will start the auction with an initial price 0, and increase it by $1 every minute. The bidders are not allowed to say anything during the process, but they can walk out of the room at any moment. If one bidder walks out of the room when the price increases to p (the bidder does not need to pay), the remaining bidder will be awarded the naming right for a price of p. If both walk out when the price reaches p, the naming right is not assigned and the two bidders do not need to pay. What should the bidders do? Explain your answer. (b) Both bidders are invited to submit their bids covertly (bids are non-negative real numbers).…A cool kid is willing to rename himself for a profit. He decides to auctionoff the naming right. Two bidders show interest. Their valuations for thenaming right are independently and uniformly distributed over [0;100]:There are several possible ideas to design the auction. The auction runs as follows. Both bidders are invited to the sameroom; an auctioneer will start the auction with an initial price 0 and increase it by $1 every minute. The bidders are not allowed to say anything during the process, but they can walk out of the room at any moment. If one bidder walks out of the room when the price increases to p(the bidder does not need to pay), the remaining bidder will be awarded the naming right for a price of p. If both walk out when the price reaches p, the naming right is not assigned and the two bidders do not need to pay. What should the bidders do? Explain your answer.A cool kid is willing to rename himself for a profit. He decides to auctionoff the naming right. Two bidders show interest. Their valuations for thenaming right are independently and uniformly distributed over [0,100].There are several possible ideas to design the auction. The auction runs as follows. Both bidders are invited to the same room; an auctioneer will start the auction with an initial price 0, and increase it by $1 every minute. The bidders are not allowed to say anything during the process, but they can walk out of the room at any moment. If one bidder walks out of the room when the price increases to p (the bidder does not need to pay), the remaining bidder will be awarded the naming right for a price of p. If both walk out when the price reaches p, the naming right is not assigned andthe two bidders do not need to pay. What should the bidders do? Explain your answer.
- You are one of five risk-neutral bidders participating in an independent private values auction. Each bidder perceives that bidders' valuations for the item are evenly distributed between $20,000 and $50,000. For each of the following auction t determine your optimal bidding strategy if you value the item at $35,000. a. First-price, sealed-bid auction. O Bid $20,00. O Bid $50,00. O Bid $35,00. O Bid $32,000 b. Dutch auction O Let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $20,000, and then yell "Minel". O Let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $35.000, and then yell "Mine!" O Let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $32,000, and then yell "Mine!" O Let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $50,000, and then yell "Mine!". C. ond-price, sealed-bid auction O Bid $50,00. O Bid $35.000 O Bid $32,00. b. Dutch auction. O Let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $20,000, and then yell…Consider the following game. Player S DE F A 10, 10 8, 7 8, 8 Player R B 8,7 9, 8 9, 12 C 9,8 7, 10 12, 7 Find the best response of step-2 Player S assuming that step-0 players (either Ror S) choose the strategy at random with equal probability. Select one: O a. F O b. E O c. B O d. A O e. C O f. DExercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 R O player pay 000 2 1 M 3 b 010 O player 3's payoff 1 2 221 2 000 0 0 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.
- 2. Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with known valuations. There is one object for sale and there are two bidders. The bidders' valuations are commonly known: One bidder has valuation 5 for the object. The other bidder has valuation 10 for the object. The rules of the auction are as follows: The bidders submit bids simultaneously and indepen- dently. Only integer bids are permitted, i.e., allowable bids are 0, 1, 2, .. with the highest bid is equally likely to be declared the winner (standard tie breaking). The winner gets the object and pays her bid. Each of the bidders (a) Find each bidder's best reply function. (b) Find all Nash equilibria. (c) Are any of the Nash equilibria strict?Consider a similar auction problm as before. Two Örms compete for a contract to build a university building. Their construction costs are independent and uniformly drawn from [0; 1]: (a) Suppose the auction is conducted as follows. Price starts at 1 (at this price both bidders would be happy to win the project). The price goes down continuously: at time t 2 [0;1]; the price will be 1 t. At any time t; any bidder can shout ìáoccinaucinihilipiliÖcious.î Once that happens, the price will stop to decline. The bidder who remains silent becomes the winner and he is paid the price at that moment. If both players say it at the same time, the auction ends without a winner. If no player speaks until t = 1 (and the price will be zero by then), the game ends and a winner is selected randomly for a price of 0: Analyze this auction. You donít have to provide rigorous mathematical proofs. How does this auction relate to (a) or (b)? 1 (b) Suppose the auction is conducted as follows.…Consider a first-price sealed bid auction of a single object with two bidders j = 1,2 and no reservation price. Bidder 1′s valuation is v1 = 2, and bidder 2′s valuation is Consider the following auction. Two buyers (i = 1,2) have valuations uni- formly distributed over [0,1]. The good is assigned to the highest bid, but the winner pays the average of his bid and the losing bid. Use the revenue equivalence principle to derive the optimal strategies in a symmetric equilibrium. Assume that the optimal bid is a linear function of the buyer’s valuation: b(vi) = cvi where c is a real number.In the event of a tie, the object is awarded by a flip of a fair coin
- A firm plans to expand its product line and faces a dilemma whether to build a small or largefacility to produce new products. If it builds a small facility and demand is low, the NPV afterdeducting for building costs will be four hundred thousand pesos. If demand is high, the firm caneither maintain the small facility or expand it. Expansion would have an NPV of four hundredfifty pesos while maintaining the small facility would have an NPV of fifty thousand pesos. If alarge facility is built and demand is high, the estimated NPV would be eight hundred thousandpesos. If demand turns out to be low, the NPV would be a loss of ten thousand. The probabilitythat the demand is high is estimated to be sixty percent.a. Analyze using a decision tree.b. Compute for EVPI.c. Determine the range over which each alternative would be best in terms of the valuewhen demand is low.2. Consider the following Bayesian game with two players. Both players move simultaneously and player 1 can choose either H or L, while player 2's options are G, M, and D. With probability 1/2 the payoffs are given by "Game 1" : GMD H 1,2 1,0 1,3 L 2,4 0,0 0,5 and with probability 1/2 the payoffs are according to "Game 2" : G |M|D H 1,2 1,3 1,0 L 2,4 0,5 0,0 (a) Find the Nash Equilibria when neither player knows which game is actually played. (b) Assume now that player 2 knows which one among the two games is actually being played. Check that the game has a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.4. An auctioneer holds a second-price auction for two bidders, Ann (A) and Bonnie (B), who have independent private values of the good 0, and 0g If a bidder wins, her payoff is her value 0 minus the price she pays, and if she loses, her payoff is 0. The values are independently and identically distributed, but otherwise you don't need to know the specific distributions to solve the problem. Ann and Bonnie's respective strategies are to bid some value b0), that is, bid given their privately-known value (type). e. Suppose the good had one true value for both bidders equal to the average of 0, and e, (signals that are still i.i.d.); hence, the good's true value has a common component. Suppose Ann knows Bonnie is going to bid her own evaluation 0, no matter what, but like normal, Ann doesn't know 0g. Explain why bidding 0, is now a strictly dominated strategy for Ann.