Country A Ch $4,50 $1,$1 a What is Country A's best response to Country B's choice to limit supply (collude)? b. What is the (Pure Strategy) Nash equilibrium of this game it played only one period (be specific as to why)? .c What famous form does this game take? c is there a Pareto efficient outcome of the game? d. If this game is commonly expected to last for exactly 3 periods, will the two firms be able to sustain collusion? Why or why not? e If this game were commonly expected to last indefinitely, would the two firms be able to sustain collusion? Why or why not?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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2 Suppose hwo oil-producing countries, Country A and Country B, in a $4 bil market are interested in forming a cartol with the goal of colluding -a signed
agroement to raise oil prices (and protits) by limiting quantity supplied to a low lovel. Suppose, in oach play of the game, their individual options are either
to collude (Co)-stick to the low quantity agreement-or to cheat (Ch)-and produce a high quantity, looding the market and capturing additional
revenues The matrix form is shown in the folowing figure
Country B
Co
Ch
Co
$2,52
0,54
Country A
Ch
$4,50
$1,$1
a What is Country A's best response to Country B's choice to limit supply (collude)?
b. What is the (Pure Strategy) Nash equilibrium of this game if played only one period (be specific as to why)?
.c What famous form does this game take?
.c is there a Pareto efficient outcome of the game?
d. If this game is commonly expected to last for exactly 3 periods, will the two firms be able to sustain collusion? Why or why not?
e If this game were commonly expected to last indefinitely, would the two firms be able to sustain collusion? Why or why not?
Transcribed Image Text:2 Suppose hwo oil-producing countries, Country A and Country B, in a $4 bil market are interested in forming a cartol with the goal of colluding -a signed agroement to raise oil prices (and protits) by limiting quantity supplied to a low lovel. Suppose, in oach play of the game, their individual options are either to collude (Co)-stick to the low quantity agreement-or to cheat (Ch)-and produce a high quantity, looding the market and capturing additional revenues The matrix form is shown in the folowing figure Country B Co Ch Co $2,52 0,54 Country A Ch $4,50 $1,$1 a What is Country A's best response to Country B's choice to limit supply (collude)? b. What is the (Pure Strategy) Nash equilibrium of this game if played only one period (be specific as to why)? .c What famous form does this game take? .c is there a Pareto efficient outcome of the game? d. If this game is commonly expected to last for exactly 3 periods, will the two firms be able to sustain collusion? Why or why not? e If this game were commonly expected to last indefinitely, would the two firms be able to sustain collusion? Why or why not?
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