Consider the version of the Beauty Contest game fromthe class, in which the players are trying to guess the average guess minus one. Moreprecisely, the utilities now are:ui (si; sj ) = -|si-(-1)|where sj/#l forj belong tI(a) Which strategies are strictly dominated in this game, and by which alternativestrategies? And so, what is the set of strategies BR11(b) What is the set BR21 ? What is the set BRni for any n > 0?

Players in the beauty contest game must guess a number in order to maximize their scoring. The…

Consider the version of the Beauty Contest game from the class, in which the players are trying to guess the average guess minus one. More precisely, the utilities now are: ui (si; sj) = -si-(-1)| where sj/#1 for j belong tl (a) Which strategies are strictly dominated in this game, and by which alternative strategies? And so, what is the set of strategies BR1i (b) What is the set BR2i? What is the set BRni for any n > 0?

Consider the version of the Beauty Contest game from the class, in which the players are trying to guess the average guess minus one. More precisely, the utilities now are: ui (si; sj) = -si-(-1)| where sj/#1 for j belong tl (a) Which strategies are strictly dominated in this game, and by which alternative strategies? And so, what is the set of strategies BR1i (b) What is the set BR2i? What is the set BRni for any n > 0?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Consider the payoff matrix below, which describes a symmetric A B A 17,17 0,14 B 14,0 8,8 (a) Find all Nash equilibria of this game, including any mixed strategy equilibria. (b) Draw the expected payoff difference diagram for this game, including all the Nash equilibria you found in (a). is (c) What would you expect to occur most frequently when this game played as a lab experiment? Justify your answer using your answers from (a) and (b).
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Exercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 R O player pay 000 2 1 M 3 b 010 O player 3's payoff 1 2 221 2 000 0 0 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.
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