Consider the payoff matrix listed below:IS|1, -13, 0|0, 3|1, 2|0, 03, 15, 3|2,12, 1Which of the following is true?a. Player 1 has a dominant strategy, but not player 2b. Neither player has a dominant strategyc. Player 2 has a dominant strategy but not player 1d. Both players have a dominant strategy

Each player is said to have a dominant strategy if he has a single, unique strategy with highest…

Answered: Consider the payoff matrix listed…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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3. The following is an interpretation of the rivalry between the United States (USA) and the Soviet Ünion (USSR) during the cold war. Each side has the choice of two strategies: Aggressive and Restrained. The payoff table is given as follows: USSR Restrained Aggressiveness Restrained 4,3 1,4 USA Aggressiveness 3,1 2,2 a) Consider this game when the two countries move simultaneously. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. b) Next consider three alternative ways in which the game could be played with sequential moves: (i) The USA moves first and the USSR moves second. (i) the USSR moves first and the USA moves second. (i) The USSR moves first, and the USA moves second, but the USSR has a further move after the USA moves. For each case, draw the game tree and find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. c) What are the key strategic issues (commitment, credibility and so on) for the two countries. (Note: Be concise. Your answer should not exceed 300 words].
Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Strategy A Player 1 B Player 2 C D E F 19, 4 9, 15 7, 18 11, 13 8, 10 17, 7 12, 15 4, 9 a. What is player 1's optimal strategy? Strategy B Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. Strategy A b. Determine player 1's equilibrium payoff. 8 *
Q2
Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 2 Strategy C D E F Player 1 A 9, 8 14, 14 18, 25 12, 19 B 23, 13 10, 18 14, 26 19, 21 a. What is player 1’s optimal strategy? multiple choice Strategy B Strategy A Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. b. Determine player 1’s equilibrium payoff. Prev
1. Consider the following N-player game. Each agent has a choice of strategy A or B. The state variable is x, the proportion of agents choosing strategy A. For every agent, the utility of choosing strategy A is U(A) = 10 +2x and the utility of choosing strategy B is U(B) = 10+3x. What is the Nash equilibrium to this game? Explain.
Use the following game table to answer the question: Player 2 Y A 10, 5 6, 3 0,0 Player 1 B 2,6 1, 3 0,0 3,5 3, 4 3, 3 One of these players has a strictly dominant strategy. Which player, and what strategy is it? Player 2; Y Player 1; A Player 2; X O Player 1; B O Player 1; X
Consider the following 2-player normal form game. Player 2 Bananas Orange Player 1 Grapes 11, 3 8, 2 Apple 9, 7 6, 5 Player 1's dominant strategy is [Select ] and Player 2's dominant strategy is [ Select ) The Nash Equilibrium of this game is ( Select ) (select all that apply).
2. For the following payoff matrix find all of the mixed strategy Nash equilibria (check for dominated strategies to eliminate). Player 1 X Y Z A 1,3 4,1 2,3 Player 2 B 2,4 3,1 0,0 C 2,3 5,0 4,2
Question > Consider the following matrix game where Player 1 moves first then Player 2 observes player 1's move and responds. Draw the game tree for the sequential move game and then determine all the Nash equilibria. Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C Strategy D -3, -2 10, 12 9, 20 Player 2 Please show each step on how to get the answer. Thank you! Strategy E 13,7 17, 17 12, 21 Strategy F 20,8 22, 16 19, 19
Question 8: Consider the strategic game above. Which of the following is true? a. for Player 1, x1 is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy b. for Player 1,x2 is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy c. for Player 1, x3 is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy d. for Player 1, no action is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy
Player 2 Left Center 30, 40 6, 20 20, 20 Right 21, 24 32, 35 10, 5 Up Middle 5, 5 40, 11 Player 1 Down 38, 42 Use the information in the game matrix above to answer questions #3 and # 4. 3. If both Players move simultaneously, then a. Player 1 has a dominant strategy, and Player 2 does not. b. Player 2 has a dominant strategy, and Player 1 does not. c. There is more than one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. d. Both players have a dominant strategy. e. There are no Nash Equilibria in pure strategies. 4. If Player 1 moves first, then is the subgame perfect equilibrium. a. (Up, Left) b. (Middle, Center) c. (Middle, Right) d. (Down, Left) e. (Down, Center)

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