Consider the game defined by the matrix: P= [-3 1, 4-3] 1. If row player uses strategy R1= [0.4 0.6], calculate the matrix R1P to determine what strategy the column player should use. What will be the expected payout of the game? If row player uses strategy R2 = [0.7 0.3], determine what strategy the column player should use. What will be the expected payout of the game?

Consider the game defined by the matrix: P= [-3 1, 4-3] 1. If row player uses strategy R1= [0.4 0.6], calculate the matrix R1P to determine what strategy the column player should use. What will be the expected payout of the game? If row player uses strategy R2 = [0.7 0.3], determine what strategy the column player should use. What will be the expected payout of the game?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Please find herewith a payoff matrix. In each cell you find the payoffs of the players associated with a particular strategy combination: The first entry is the payoff of player 1, the second entry is the payoff of player2. Player 2 t1 t2 t3 Player 1 S1 3, 4 1, 0 5, 3 S2 0, 12 8, 12 4, 20 S3 2, 0 2, 11 1, 0 Suppose both players select their strategies (S1, S2 or S3 for player 1 and t1, t2 or t3 for player 2) simultaneously and that the game is played once. In your explanation to the questions below, please do refer to the figures in the matrix. Suppose player 2 could move before player 1 (i.e. has a first mover advantage). In your explanation to the questions below, please do refer to the figures in the matrix. What strategy would (s)he select? Is it really an ‘advantage’ for player 2 to move first? Or does player 2 benefit from being the second mover (and hence player 1 moving first)? I.e. for this question, do not make a comparison to the outcome of the…
Consider the following payoff matrix: Diane E W 1, 1 1, 2 1, 2 2, 0 3 0. 2 3. 3 1, 3 1, 2 1, 0 1. 1 0, 3 2, 2 Camilla. E 2, 1 3, 1 W a) Find the Nash Equilibria (NE). b) Eliminate iteratively the strictly dominated strategies. Briefly discuss for each player which actions survive the elimination process.
8) Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the following normal form game. Player 2 T1 T2 T3 2, 3 3, 5 1, 1 Player 1 S2 1, 4 4, 3 0, 5 Player 1 attaches probability (S1, S2) = () and Player 2 attaches probability (T1, T2, T3) = ( ) Player 1 attaches probability (S1, S2) = (.) and Player 2 attaches probability (T1, T2, T3) = (qi, 42, 1 – q1 – 92) where q1 , and 0 < q2 S %3D Player 1 attaches probability (S1, S2) = (G,;) and Player 2 attaches probability (T1, T2, T1) = (qı.42, 1 – q1 – 42) where 0 < qi <, and q2 = 3. Player 1 attaches probability (S1, S) = (;, -) and player 2 attaches probability (T1, T2, T3) = (1.42, 1- q1- 42) where 0 s qı s and q2 =
lease find herewith a payoff matrix. In each cell you find the payoffs of the players associated with a particular strategy combination: The first entry is the payoff of player 1, the second entry is the payoff of player2. Player 2 t1 t2 t3 Player 1 S1 3, 4 1, 0 5, 3 S2 0, 12 8, 12 4, 20 S3 2, 0 2, 11 1, 0 Suppose both players select their strategies (S1, S2 or S3 for player 1 and t1, t2 or t3 for player 2) simultaneously and that the game is played once. In your explanation to the questions below, please do refer to the figures in the matrix. Does player 2 have a dominant strategy? If so, which one? Does player 1 have a dominant strategy? If so, which one? No explanation required. Is there one or more Nash equilibria in the game? If so, which one(s)?
please help with two
The bimatrix represents a simultaneous move game between Rowena and Colin. Rowena's payoff is the left number in each cell. ROWENA Up Down 0.25Left +0.75Right 0.65Left +0.35Right Find Colin's mixed strategy that makes Rowena indifferent between a pure strategy of playing Up and a pure strategy of playing Down. 0.5Left +0.5Right Left 1,16 2,20 0.45Left +0.55Right COLIN Right 4,6 3,40
Answer these questions on a separate sheet of paper. -3 1 Consider the game defined by the matrix: P = 4 -3 1. If Row Player uses the strategy R = [0.4 0.6], calculate the matrix R1P to determine what strategy the Column Player should use. What will be the expected payout of the game? 2. If Row Player uses the strategy R2 = [0.7 0.3], determine what strategy the Column Player should use. What will be the expected payout of the game? %3D 3. Which of the strategies R1 and R2 will end up being better for Row Player? Explain.
E3 Bayesian Game]. Consider a Bayesian game described by a following payoff matrix. Please solve (show your solution). 1. Enumerate all pure strategies for each player. 2. Suppose that player 1 observes his type ?1 = 3. How does player 1 think of the probability of ?2? 3. Find a (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
8
Last answer was incorrect.
Please solve in 30 minute
W X Y Z 47, 15| 39, 41 45, 53 12, 56 In equilibrium, what is the probability that player 1 will use the pure strategy X in this game?