Consider the following two extensive form games of imperfect information. For each game: a) Set out the normal form of the game, and find its pure strategy Nash equilibria. b) Find its pure strategy weak sequential equilibria (remember: you have specify the beliefs of player 2 at his information set).

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Hi, some game theory homework help please!

### Extensive Form Games of Imperfect Information

Consider the following two extensive form games of imperfect information. For each game:

a) Set out the normal form of the game, and find its pure strategy Nash equilibria.  
b) Find its pure strategy weak sequential equilibria (remember: you have to specify the beliefs of player 2 at his information set).

#### Game 1

**Description:**
This game involves two players. Player 1 makes the first move choosing between L (Left), M (Middle), or R (Right). After M, Player 2 moves with choices ℓ (left) or r (right).

**Payoffs:**
- If Player 1 chooses L: (2, 4)
- If Player 1 chooses R: (3, 1)
- If Player 1 chooses M, and Player 2 chooses ℓ: (1, 3)
- If Player 1 chooses M, and Player 2 chooses r: (0, 0)

**Structure Explanation:**
- Player 1's decisions branch at the top.
- Player 2's decision branch is under Player 1’s move M, indicated by a dashed line (representing imperfect information).

#### Game 2: Selten’s Horse

**Description:**
This is a three-player game. Player 1 decides first between A (advancing) and D (disengaging). If Player 1 advances, Player 2 decides between L (left) and R (right). If Player 1 disengages, the third player makes a choice.

**Payoffs:**
- If Player 1 chooses D, and Player 3 chooses L: (0, 0, 0)
- If Player 1 chooses D, and Player 3 chooses R: (3, 3, 2)
- If Player 1 chooses A, Player 2 at choice 2 chooses L: (4, 4, 0)
- If Player 1 chooses A, Player 2 at choice 2 chooses R: (0, 1, 1)
- If Player 1 advances directly with action a: (1, 1, 1)

**Structure Explanation:**
- Player 1's decision initiates the game.
- Player 2’s decision, indicated by a dashed line, follows Player 1's advancement.
- A branch also allows Player 3 to move if the game proceeds after Player
Transcribed Image Text:### Extensive Form Games of Imperfect Information Consider the following two extensive form games of imperfect information. For each game: a) Set out the normal form of the game, and find its pure strategy Nash equilibria. b) Find its pure strategy weak sequential equilibria (remember: you have to specify the beliefs of player 2 at his information set). #### Game 1 **Description:** This game involves two players. Player 1 makes the first move choosing between L (Left), M (Middle), or R (Right). After M, Player 2 moves with choices ℓ (left) or r (right). **Payoffs:** - If Player 1 chooses L: (2, 4) - If Player 1 chooses R: (3, 1) - If Player 1 chooses M, and Player 2 chooses ℓ: (1, 3) - If Player 1 chooses M, and Player 2 chooses r: (0, 0) **Structure Explanation:** - Player 1's decisions branch at the top. - Player 2's decision branch is under Player 1’s move M, indicated by a dashed line (representing imperfect information). #### Game 2: Selten’s Horse **Description:** This is a three-player game. Player 1 decides first between A (advancing) and D (disengaging). If Player 1 advances, Player 2 decides between L (left) and R (right). If Player 1 disengages, the third player makes a choice. **Payoffs:** - If Player 1 chooses D, and Player 3 chooses L: (0, 0, 0) - If Player 1 chooses D, and Player 3 chooses R: (3, 3, 2) - If Player 1 chooses A, Player 2 at choice 2 chooses L: (4, 4, 0) - If Player 1 chooses A, Player 2 at choice 2 chooses R: (0, 1, 1) - If Player 1 advances directly with action a: (1, 1, 1) **Structure Explanation:** - Player 1's decision initiates the game. - Player 2’s decision, indicated by a dashed line, follows Player 1's advancement. - A branch also allows Player 3 to move if the game proceeds after Player
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