Consider the following two extensive form games of imperfect information. For each game: a) Set out the normal form of the game, and find its pure strategy Nash equilibria. b) Find its pure strategy weak sequential equilibria (remember: you have specify the beliefs of player 2 at his information set).
Consider the following two extensive form games of imperfect information. For each game: a) Set out the normal form of the game, and find its pure strategy Nash equilibria. b) Find its pure strategy weak sequential equilibria (remember: you have specify the beliefs of player 2 at his information set).
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
100%
Hi, some

Transcribed Image Text:### Extensive Form Games of Imperfect Information
Consider the following two extensive form games of imperfect information. For each game:
a) Set out the normal form of the game, and find its pure strategy Nash equilibria.
b) Find its pure strategy weak sequential equilibria (remember: you have to specify the beliefs of player 2 at his information set).
#### Game 1
**Description:**
This game involves two players. Player 1 makes the first move choosing between L (Left), M (Middle), or R (Right). After M, Player 2 moves with choices ℓ (left) or r (right).
**Payoffs:**
- If Player 1 chooses L: (2, 4)
- If Player 1 chooses R: (3, 1)
- If Player 1 chooses M, and Player 2 chooses ℓ: (1, 3)
- If Player 1 chooses M, and Player 2 chooses r: (0, 0)
**Structure Explanation:**
- Player 1's decisions branch at the top.
- Player 2's decision branch is under Player 1’s move M, indicated by a dashed line (representing imperfect information).
#### Game 2: Selten’s Horse
**Description:**
This is a three-player game. Player 1 decides first between A (advancing) and D (disengaging). If Player 1 advances, Player 2 decides between L (left) and R (right). If Player 1 disengages, the third player makes a choice.
**Payoffs:**
- If Player 1 chooses D, and Player 3 chooses L: (0, 0, 0)
- If Player 1 chooses D, and Player 3 chooses R: (3, 3, 2)
- If Player 1 chooses A, Player 2 at choice 2 chooses L: (4, 4, 0)
- If Player 1 chooses A, Player 2 at choice 2 chooses R: (0, 1, 1)
- If Player 1 advances directly with action a: (1, 1, 1)
**Structure Explanation:**
- Player 1's decision initiates the game.
- Player 2’s decision, indicated by a dashed line, follows Player 1's advancement.
- A branch also allows Player 3 to move if the game proceeds after Player
Expert Solution

This question has been solved!
Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.
This is a popular solution!
Trending now
This is a popular solution!
Step by step
Solved in 3 steps with 4 images

Knowledge Booster
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.Recommended textbooks for you


Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON

Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON


Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON

Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON

Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education