Consider a Vickery auction. There are N bidders, each of them values the object £vi, with i = 1…N. Each bidder can submit a bid in a sealed envelope. Once all the bids have been made, the envelopes are opened. The winner of the auction is the bidder who made the highest bid, however, s/he pays the second-highest bid. What are the weakly dominant strategies in this game? Is there only one?

Consider a Vickery auction. There are N bidders, each of them values the object £vi, with i = 1…N. Each bidder can submit a bid in a sealed envelope. Once all the bids have been made, the envelopes are opened. The winner of the auction is the bidder who made the highest bid, however, s/he pays the second-highest bid. What are the weakly dominant strategies in this game? Is there only one?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2MC

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