Consider a two-agents, two goods economy, in which both agents, A and B, are represented by the following utility function: UA(r1, 12) = rr2 UB(y1, 42) = Y1y There are w units of each good in the economy. 1. Characterize the set of Pareto optimal allocations and represent it in the Edgeworth box. The 3 units of each goods are initially share as follows: A has w units of good 1 and zero unit of good 2; B has zero unit of good 1 and w units of good 2. 2. Determine the Walrasian equilibrium

Consider a two-agents, two goods economy, in which both agents, A and B, are represented by the following utility function: UA(r1, 12) = rr2 UB(y1, 42) = Y1y There are w units of each good in the economy. 1. Characterize the set of Pareto optimal allocations and represent it in the Edgeworth box. The 3 units of each goods are initially share as follows: A has w units of good 1 and zero unit of good 2; B has zero unit of good 1 and w units of good 2. 2. Determine the Walrasian equilibrium

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

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4. Aaron and Burris have the following utility functions over two goods, x and y. Aaron’s utility function: UA(xA, yA) = min{xA/3, yA} Burris’s utility function: UB(xB, yB) = 9xB + 3yB Aaron’s endowment is eA = (2, 4). Burris’ endowment is eB = (10, 8). In an Edgeworth Box diagram, show which allocations are in the core. Solve for the set of Pareto optimal allocations (i.e. the contract curve) in the Edgeworth Box. Illustrate the contract curve in an Edgeworth Box diagram. Let good y be the numeraire (i.e. set py = 1 and let px = p). Solve for the Walrasian competitive equilibrium allocation and price ratio.
1. a) Consider an economy with 3 agents, Mohammed (M), David (D) and Susan (S). There are two goods available, good x, and good y. The marginal rates of substitution (where good x is on the horizontal axis and good y is on the vertical axis) are given by for Mohammed, for David and for Mohammed and David are both consuming twice as much of the good x than good y, while Susan is consuming equal amounts of x and y. What are the conditions for Pareto efficiency in an exchange economy? Are these consumption levels economically efficient? Can these consumption allocations be observed in a perfectly competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy without production? Explain. b. There are two firms in the economy. Each firm employs positive amounts of capital and labour. The technology satisfies diminishing marginal rate of technical substitution of labour for capital. Currently, A’s marginal rate of technical substitution of labour for capital is 4 while B’s marginal rate of technical…
5.18 In a two-good, two-consumer economy, utility functions are u¹ (x₁, x₂) = x₁(x₂)², u² (x₁, x₂) = (x₁)²x₂. Total endowments are (10, 20). (a) A social planner wants to allocate goods to maximise consumer 1's utility while holding con- sumer 2's utility at u² = 8000/27. Find the assignment of goods to consumers that solves the planner's problem and show that the solution is Pareto efficient. (b) Suppose, instead, that the planner just divides the endowments so that e¹ = (10, 0) and e² = (0, 20) and then lets the consumers transact through perfectly competitive markets. Find the Walrasian equilibrium and show that the WEAs are the same as the solution in part (a).
2(b)There are three people and two goods in an economy. The utility functions and the initial bundles are given below: U1 = X11X 12 U = 2x 21+ X 22 U3 = X 31 X 3z+X 32 W; = (0,8) W;= (2,2) Wy= (8,0) Suppose it is suggested that the three traders move to the allocation x given by x;= (1,2), x2= (8,4), X3= (1,4) b. Show that x makes no one worse off than the original allocation.
5. Consider a two-consumer one-firm economy with a single input good and a single output good. Consumers' utility functions are u4(x4) Suppose that the input good is divisible and that wA = wB = 1/2. Suppose that the output good is indivisible (i.e., that xg, q = 0, 1, 2, ...), and that the firm's production technology is such that it requires 1 unit of input to produce one unit of output. rA + 3r and uB(xB) 4x? + x. (a) Derive the Pareto set of this economy. (b) For all Pareto-efficient allocations from (a), derive a competitive equilibrium for this economy that generates these allocations.
Q. It is possible to have a Pareto efficient allocation where everyone is worse off than they are at an allocation that is not Pareto efficient?
9. Consider an Edgeworth box economy with two consumers, whose utility func- tions and endowments are u'(x},x}) = (x}Xx})} (5,5) In the following, use the normalization p2 = 1. (a) Find the competitive equilibrium price. (b) State the first fundamental theorem of welfare and verify that it holds in this economy. (e) Consider the allocation ĩ = (x',) = (2,3), (8, 7). Show whether this allo- cation can supported as an equilibrium with transfers. (d) State the second fundamental theorem of welfare, and briefly discuss whether the result in part (c) conform with or violate this theorem. 3.