Consider a two-agents, two goods economy, in which both agents, A and B, are represented by the following utility function: UA(r1, 12) = rr2 UB(y1, 42) = Y1y There are w units of each good in the economy. 1. Characterize the set of Pareto optimal allocations and represent it in the Edgeworth box. The 3 units of each goods are initially share as follows: A has w units of good 1 and zero unit of good 2; B has zero unit of good 1 and w units of good 2. 2. Determine the Walrasian equilibrium

Consider a two-agents, two goods economy, in which both agents, A and B, are represented by the following utility function: UA(r1, 12) = rr2 UB(y1, 42) = Y1y There are w units of each good in the economy. 1. Characterize the set of Pareto optimal allocations and represent it in the Edgeworth box. The 3 units of each goods are initially share as follows: A has w units of good 1 and zero unit of good 2; B has zero unit of good 1 and w units of good 2. 2. Determine the Walrasian equilibrium

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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4. Aaron and Burris have the following utility functions over two goods, x and y. Aaron’s utility function: UA(xA, yA) = min{xA/3, yA} Burris’s utility function: UB(xB, yB) = 9xB + 3yB Aaron’s endowment is eA = (2, 4). Burris’ endowment is eB = (10, 8). In an Edgeworth Box diagram, show which allocations are in the core. Solve for the set of Pareto optimal allocations (i.e. the contract curve) in the Edgeworth Box. Illustrate the contract curve in an Edgeworth Box diagram. Let good y be the numeraire (i.e. set py = 1 and let px = p). Solve for the Walrasian competitive equilibrium allocation and price ratio.
1. a) Consider an economy with 3 agents, Mohammed (M), David (D) and Susan (S). There are two goods available, good x, and good y. The marginal rates of substitution (where good x is on the horizontal axis and good y is on the vertical axis) are given by for Mohammed, for David and for Mohammed and David are both consuming twice as much of the good x than good y, while Susan is consuming equal amounts of x and y. What are the conditions for Pareto efficiency in an exchange economy? Are these consumption levels economically efficient? Can these consumption allocations be observed in a perfectly competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy without production? Explain. b. There are two firms in the economy. Each firm employs positive amounts of capital and labour. The technology satisfies diminishing marginal rate of technical substitution of labour for capital. Currently, A’s marginal rate of technical substitution of labour for capital is 4 while B’s marginal rate of technical…
6. In an Edgeworth box for two consumers, A and B, with endowments of commodities Xa and d Ya are A's endowments, Xb and Yb are B's, and Xo = Xa + Xb, Yo = Ya + Yb), the competitive equilibrium allocation of the two commodities represents a mutual tangency of both consumers' indifference curves with each other and with a common budget line. (a) The conditions require that A and B consume at a point on their budget lines where their indifference curves have the same marginal rate of substitution. and equilibrium for the market as a whole requires that the sum of the individuals' demands for each commodity must equal the totals (Xo and Yo) available. Mathematically express the point of equilibrium, that is, express the above statement with equations in relating each endowments, equilibrium points (Xa, Xb, Ya, Yb), and totals ((Xo, Yo).
5.18 In a two-good, two-consumer economy, utility functions are u¹ (x₁, x₂) = x₁(x₂)², u² (x₁, x₂) = (x₁)²x₂. Total endowments are (10, 20). (a) A social planner wants to allocate goods to maximise consumer 1's utility while holding con- sumer 2's utility at u² = 8000/27. Find the assignment of goods to consumers that solves the planner's problem and show that the solution is Pareto efficient. (b) Suppose, instead, that the planner just divides the endowments so that e¹ = (10, 0) and e² = (0, 20) and then lets the consumers transact through perfectly competitive markets. Find the Walrasian equilibrium and show that the WEAs are the same as the solution in part (a).
Smith and Jones are stranded on a desert island. Each has in her possession some slices of ham (H) and cheese (C). Smith prefers to consume ham and cheese in the fixed proportion of 2 slices of cheese to each slice of ham. Her utility function is given by Us = min(10H, 5C). Jones, on the other hand, regards ham and cheese as substitutes – she is always willing to trade 3 slices of ham for 4 slices of cheese, and her utility function is given by UJ = 4H + 3C. Total endowments are 100 slices of ham and 200 slices of cheese. a. Draw the Edgeworth Box diagram for all possible exchanges in this situation. What is the contract curve for this exchange economy? b. Suppose Smith’s initial endowment is 40 slices of ham and 80 slices of cheese (Jones has the remaining ham and cheese as her initial endowment). What mutually beneficial trades are possible in this economy and what utility levels will Smith and Jones enjoy from such trades? c. Now imagine a new endowment in which Smith has 60 slices…
iii) Define "Free Good" in a general equilibrium framework. Explain whether the goods are free goods in the following context after determining the equilibrium price. Consider an exchange economy. There are two consumers A and B and two goods X and Y. A has lexicographic preference over good X and B also has the same type of preference. Their endowment is (5,5) each.
2(b)There are three people and two goods in an economy. The utility functions and the initial bundles are given below: U1 = X11X 12 U = 2x 21+ X 22 U3 = X 31 X 3z+X 32 W; = (0,8) W;= (2,2) Wy= (8,0) Suppose it is suggested that the three traders move to the allocation x given by x;= (1,2), x2= (8,4), X3= (1,4) b. Show that x makes no one worse off than the original allocation.
6. In an Edgeworth box for two consumers, A and B, with endowments of commodities Xa and d Ya are A's endowments, Xb and Yb are B's, and Xo = Xa + Xb, Yo = Ya + Yb), the competitive equilibrium allocation of the two commodities represents a mutual tangency of both consumers' indifference curves with each other and with a common budget line. (b) Suppose MRSa = Ya/Xa, MRSb = Yb/Xb, Xa = 10, Ya, = 100, Xb= 50, Yb = 20, and let good Y be the numeraire (Py = 1). Verify that the competitive equilibrium price is Px = 2.
Find all Pareto optimal allocations, the egalitarian allocation and the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes for the following problems. 1 Ann and Bob need to divide 4 items. Their preferences are as follows: Y W Ann 25 25 25 25 Bob 10 20 30 40
1.2 Ann and Bob each own 10 bottles of beer and, altogether, they own 20 bags of peanuts. There are no other people and no other goods in the economy, and no production of either good is possible. Using a to denote bottles of beer and y to denote bags of peanuts, Ann's and Bob's preferences are described by the following utility functions: UA (XA, YA) = TAYA and UB (XB, YB) = 2xB+ YB. In each of the following cases, determine the market equilibrium price ratio and allocation and depict the equilibrium in an Edgeworth box diagram. (a) Bob owns 20 bags of peanuts and Ann owns no peanuts. (b) Bob owns 15 bags of peanuts and Ann owns 5 bags. (c) Ann owns 20 bags of peanuts and Bob owns no peanuts.
4. General Equilibrium 1) : Consider, U1 (21, y1) = 5(x141) U2(r2, Y2) = Inx, + 5lny, W = (6,4) and W2 = (3,6) a. Characterize the Pareto efficient allocations and contract curve b. Which allocations are in the core c. Find the Competitive/Walrasian equiiîbrium for this problem d. Is the answer of c in the core
Consider an Edgeworth box economy, where preferences and endowments are given by. ( attached below ) In the following, use the normalization p2 = 1.(a) Find all the Pareto optimal allocations (use x1 to parameterize thePO allocations). (b) Suppose the government wants individual 1 to have the bundle x1 = (5, 9). Show whether the government can induce this outcome an equilib- rium with transfers. Find the supporting prices and transfers if possible. (c) State the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare and explain how the result in part (b) relates to that theorem. (d) Suppose the government does not care what bundle individual 1 gets and only wants to ensure that the individual 1 receives utility level equal to 45. Show whether this can be achieved as an equilibrium with transfers. Find the supporting prices and transfers if possible.