Consider a market in which there are many potential buyers and sellers of used cars. Each potential seller has one car, which is either of high quality (a plum) or low quality (a lemon). A seller with a low-quality car is willing to sell it for $4,500, whereas a seller with a high-quality car is willing to SAL sell it for $8,500. A buyer is willing to pay $5,500 for a low- quality car and $10,500 for a high-quality car. Of course, only the seller knows whether a car is of high or low quality, as illustrated in the accompanying image: Suppose that 85% of sellers have low-quality cars. Assume buyers know that 85% of sellers have low-quality cars but are unable to determine quality of individual cars. If all sellers offer their cars for sale and buyers have no way of determining whether a car is a high-quality plum or a low-quality lemon, the exp value of a car to a buyer is S (Hint: The expected value of a car is the sum of the probability of getting a low-quality car multiplied value of a low-quality car and the probability of getting a high-quality car multiplied by the value of a high-quality car.) Suppose buyers are willing to pay only up to the expected value of a car that you found in the previous question. Since sellers of low-quality cars are willing to sell for $4,500, while sellers of high-quality cars are willing to sell for $8,500, will be willing to participate in this market at that price. The dilemma in this problem is an example of which of the following economic concepts? Screening Moral hazard Signaling O Adverse selection
Consider a market in which there are many potential buyers and sellers of used cars. Each potential seller has one car, which is either of high quality (a plum) or low quality (a lemon). A seller with a low-quality car is willing to sell it for $4,500, whereas a seller with a high-quality car is willing to SAL sell it for $8,500. A buyer is willing to pay $5,500 for a low- quality car and $10,500 for a high-quality car. Of course, only the seller knows whether a car is of high or low quality, as illustrated in the accompanying image: Suppose that 85% of sellers have low-quality cars. Assume buyers know that 85% of sellers have low-quality cars but are unable to determine quality of individual cars. If all sellers offer their cars for sale and buyers have no way of determining whether a car is a high-quality plum or a low-quality lemon, the exp value of a car to a buyer is S (Hint: The expected value of a car is the sum of the probability of getting a low-quality car multiplied value of a low-quality car and the probability of getting a high-quality car multiplied by the value of a high-quality car.) Suppose buyers are willing to pay only up to the expected value of a car that you found in the previous question. Since sellers of low-quality cars are willing to sell for $4,500, while sellers of high-quality cars are willing to sell for $8,500, will be willing to participate in this market at that price. The dilemma in this problem is an example of which of the following economic concepts? Screening Moral hazard Signaling O Adverse selection
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Transcribed Image Text:Consider a market in which there are many potential buyers
and sellers of used cars. Each potential seller has one car,
which is either of high quality (a plum) or low quality (a
lemon). A seller with a low-quality car is willing to sell it for
$4,500, whereas a seller with a high-quality car is willing to
SAL
sell it for $8,500. A buyer is willing to pay $5,500 for a low-
quality car and $10,500 for a high-quality car. Of course, only
the seller knows whether a car is of high or low quality, as
illustrated in the accompanying image:
Suppose that 85% of sellers have low-quality cars. Assume buyers know that 85% of sellers have low-quality cars but are unable to determine the
quality of individual cars.
If all sellers offer their cars for sale and buyers have no way of determining whether a car is a high-quality plum or a low-quality lemon, the expected
value of a car to a buyer is $
(Hint: The expected value of a car is the sum of the probability of getting a low-quality car multiplied by the
value of a low-quality car and the probability of getting a high-quality car multiplied by the value of a high-quality car.)
Suppose buyers are willing to pay only up to the expected value of a car that you found in the previous question.
Since sellers of low-quality cars are willing to sell for $4,500, while sellers of high-quality cars are willing to sell for $8,500,
will be willing to participate in this market at that price.
The dilemma in this problem is an example of which of the following economic concepts?
Screening
Moral hazard
Signaling
O Adverse selection
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