Consider a Japanese firm that sells product Y in the local market and contemplates sales to the US. If the Japanese firm enters the American market it will compete in quantities against a US firm already in the market. The inverse demand for Y in the US is Pus = 250 - Q (all prices and costs in this problem are in $US), where Q = qu + q1, is total quantity eventually sold by the two competitors. The production of Y requires operating a plant at a fixed cost F = 300, as well as 1 unit of labor and 1 unit of capital per unit of output. Currently, at both the US and Japan the cost of capital is $15/unit and that of labor $10/unit. The Japanese firm has the option to either invest directly in operating a plant in the US, or use at no extra fixed cost its already existing plant in Japan, shipping its product to the US. In that case a transportation cost of $10/unit has to be paid on top of any production cost; also, American customs require a $5/unit duty for any Y imports.

Consider a Japanese firm that sells product Y in the local market and contemplates sales to the US. If the Japanese firm enters the American market it will compete in quantities against a US firm already in the market. The inverse demand for Y in the US is Pus = 250 - Q (all prices and costs in this problem are in $US), where Q = qu + q1, is total quantity eventually sold by the two competitors. The production of Y requires operating a plant at a fixed cost F = 300, as well as 1 unit of labor and 1 unit of capital per unit of output. Currently, at both the US and Japan the cost of capital is $15/unit and that of labor $10/unit. The Japanese firm has the option to either invest directly in operating a plant in the US, or use at no extra fixed cost its already existing plant in Japan, shipping its product to the US. In that case a transportation cost of $10/unit has to be paid on top of any production cost; also, American customs require a $5/unit duty for any Y imports.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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